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ABSTRACT
 
In the anti-semitic tract "On the Jewish Question," Karl
 
Marx constructs valid arguments and decries man's alienation
 
from society. But he also uses stereotypes and innuendo to
 
distort readers' perceptions. This study analyzes how both
 
rhetorically and linguistically Marx constructs his essay in
 
an attempt to persuade his audience to accept unquestioningly
 
his argument. After an examination of the historical and
 
psychological background that produced Marx, this paper
 
investigates his use of figures of speech, the enthymeme,
 
informal fallacies, and hypothetical syllogisms to arouse
 
prejudice, pity and anger. This thesis (borrowing from the
 
techniques of discourse analysis) also demonstrates Marx's
 
use of the end-focus principle, segmentation, salience and
 
sequence to further his argument. And finally, by probing the
 
pragmatics of implicature, presupposition, and deliberate
 
ambiguity, this investigation uncovers Marx's implicit call
 
for genocide.
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But when a man's religion becomes really
 
frantic; when it is a positive torment to
 
him; and, in fine, makes this earth of
 
ours and uncomfortable inn to lodge in;
 
then I think it high time to take that
 
individual aside and argue the point with
 
him.
 
Herman Melville
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Do I hate my brother because he reminds
 
me of myself, or do I hate my brother
 
because he reminds me of someone who is
 
"not" myself? Whom do I hate, the one
 
who is me, or the one who is anything but
 
me?
 
Elie Wiesel
 
Born in 1952, I thought I'd been liberally educated by
 
my parents. Raised agnostic during the McCarthy era, I often
 
had to counter charges of being a Communist for not attending
 
any house of worship. At eighteen, I found out that I was of
 
Jewish descent. When I asked why this had been kept from me,
 
my father countered with, "Your grandfather's parentage
 
didn't matter to him, so why should it matter to you?" Why
 
was it suddenly such a big deal to me? My question to him
 
was: if it wasn't a "big deal" why had no one ever mentioned
 
it?
 
Similarly, I had friends who were Mexican-American yet
 
raised not to be. And, if they could speak Spanish, they
 
were cautioned not to use it outside of the family and they
 
were never, never to speak English with an accent.
 
In 1971 at UCLA, during the height of the Black Panther
 
movement and the establishment of the Black Students' Union
 
(BSU), my three black roommates were discriminated against—
 
not by the whites in the dormitory but by the blacks. As
 
they refused to exchange me for an acceptable "sister"
 
roommate, they were labeled Uncle Toms and the four of us
 
spent our freshman year entering by the basement elevator
 
rather than confront the taunts of the "brothers" who
 
occupied the lobby in the main entrance.
 
Assimilation was everything then and if assimilation
 
wasn't possible, strident segregation was equally valid. The
 
shadow of slavery, the Holocaust and MCCarthyism still
 
clouded minds and spirits. Perhaps in reaction to all this,
 
I decided to leave the U.S. nhd make a new life in the
 
communal society of kibbutz in Israel. Ten years later,
 
upon my return to America to complete my neglected formal
 
education^ it was with some shock and embarrassmeht that I
 
discovered Karl Marx, the father of communism, had written an
 
anti-Jewish tract'— "^Oh the Jewish Question Tiie irohy was
 
overwhelming., while I was well aware he had said,
 
"Religion...is the opium of the people," I had never
 
considered that he, a Jew, might regard the Jews as anathema
 
and an obstacle to Communism because of their being Jews.
 
Amazingly, Marx's essay hasn't received much critical
 
attention. One of the few who doesn't circumvent the issue
 
is Stephen Greenblatt who says, in Learning to Curse, "[Marx]
 
seize[d] upon the Jew as a kind of powerful rhetorical
 
device, a way of marshalling deep popular hatred and
 
clarifying its object" (41). Instead many, while referring to
 
some individuals' racist anti-Semitic interpretations,
 
sidestep these connotations and, like Shlomo AVineri,
 
conclude that though it presents "a rather unflattering image
 
of Judaism [this] somehow overshadows the question about
 
[Marx's] actual attitude which caused the essay to be
 
written, i.e., the position of the Jews in Prussia" (448).
 
My study attempts to unite an historical overview of the
 
time and place in which Marx was writing with philosophical
 
and psychological understahdings of hate and
 
anti-Semitism—as they specifically relate to Marx—and
 
examine how both rhetorically and linguistically Marx
 
constructs his essay in an attempt to persuade his audience
 
to accept unquestioningly his argument.
 
Marx's essay includes numerous, blatantly anti-Jewish
 
remarks but the basis for them is hard to pin down; his anti-

Semitism is puzzling. Hopefully, this study will illuminate
 
the enigma.
 
As I have worked from an English trahslation of Marx's
 
original German, a note with regard to this choice is in
 
order. Robert Tucker, the editor and translator of the
 
particular text ("On the Jewish Question") I have used says
 
in his "Notes on Texts and Terminology," "Translators of
 
Marx from German into other languages have had to resolve
 
some special problems, arising in part from Marx's use of
 
Hegelian philosophical terminology." This, while a problem
 
for the translator trying to determine whether "alienation"
 
or "estrangement" is the best English equivalent for Marx's
 
use of entfremdung, did not present difficulties in my
 
particular rhetorical-linguistic analysis. There are those
 
who have asked how I can apply the end-focus principle, the
 
principle of climax, etc. when dealing with the work in
 
translation. To this I reply, the analysis was performed on
 
the translation, and its merit, as such, must be left to the
 
reader to determine.
 
CHAPTER ONE
 
MARX'S MILIEU
 
A philosopher of imposing stature doesn't
 
think in a vacuum. Even his most
 
abstract ideas are, to some extent,
 
conditioned by what is or is not known in
 
the time when he lives.
 
Alfred North Whitehead
 
Karl Marx promulgated human emancipation, most notably
 
in his well-known works, the Communist Manifesto (1848) and
 
the much later Capital (1867-95). But years earlier, in "On
 
the Jewish Question" (1844), he laid the groundwork for his
 
vision for the future of mankind. In doing so he needed a
 
culprit responsible for the way things were at the time. He
 
seize[d] upon the Jew as a kind of powerful rhetorical
 
device, a way of marshalling deep popular hatred and
 
clarifying its object. The Jew is charged not with
 
racial deviance or religious impiety but with economic
 
and social crime, crime that is committed not only
 
against the dominant Christian society but, in less
 
'pure' form, by that society. (Greenblatt 41)
 
In the first part of "On the Jewish Question," written
 
in response to two essays by Bruno Bauer--"The Jewish
 
Question" (1842) and "The Capacity of the Present-day Jews
 
and Christians to Become Free,"(1842)^-^Marx criticizes
 
politics to make the case that political man is divided, torn
 
between two constraints of his own making: his adherence to
 
his civil society and to his state. Civil society was
 
further complicated by man's religion. In a religious state,
 
Marx believed mankind to be the furthest from realizing his
 
emancipation. However, in those countries, like the United
 
States, which had succeeded in abolishing a state religion,
 
he saw man as "politically emancipated from religion [which]
 
is not to be finally and completely emancipated from
 
religion, because political emancipation is not the final and
 
absolute form of human emancipation" ("Question" 32). The
 
reason for his non-acceptance of political emancipation as
 
true human emancipation was simple; the state could consider
 
itself free without the individual being free, in that
 
religion would be relegated to the realm of the civil society
 
and worship by the individual. It was still a form of
 
separation and egoism. He concluded that the "question of
 
the relation between political emancipation and religion
 
becomes for us a question of the relation between political
 
emancipation and human emancipation" ("Question" 31).
 
Marx disputes Bauer's contention that the state can be
 
emancipated while the individual is free to practice religion
 
privately. As one of the so-called "rights of man," that
 
contention, Marx says, serves only to promote self-interest,
 
further separating man and state-—putting the state at the
 
disposal of man. He concludes that "human emancipation
 
requires the ending of the division between man as an
 
egoistic being in 'civil society' and man as abstract citizen
 
in the state." ("Question" 26). In the Second part of the
 
essay he criticizes economics/commerce which he equates with
 
Judaism, thereby making the case that society must be
 
emancipated from Judaism.
 
Stephen Greenblatt points out that Karl Marx wisely
 
sidesteps the issue of race in his essay, but it is worth our
 
time to consider why Marx should choose to overlook this
 
commonly preferred basis for promoting prejudice.
 
Race is something that mankind has used as a measurement
 
of quality. There are those who contend that certain races
 
are superior to others. They base this opinion oh certain
 
distinctions and characteristics such as relative
 
intelligence, cranial capacity, eye color and shape, skin
 
pigmentation, brow ridges, zygomatic arch placement, jaw
 
structure, stature, etc. A belief that certain bloodlines
 
are "purer" or better than others has allowed people to
 
relegate others to distinct classes. Yet wars, such as the
 
French Revolution—a "class struggle," have never settled the
 
race issue nor the theories surrounding them.
 
 But race as a biological construct did not emerge until
 
the 1860s and 1870s, quite some time after Marx wrote "On the
 
Jewish Question." So, because he knew very little about race
 
he did not avoid the issue# but rather did not address it at
 
all.
 
Religion is another issue that we humans use to qualify
 
individuals. If we use Webster's secular definition we can
 
say that religion is a "cause, principle, or system of
 
beliefs held to with ardor and faith." The Jews have the
 
dubious distinction of having the word, "Jew" used to define
 
both their religion and race.
 
In The Oxford English Dictionary, the word "Jew" is
 
defined as "A person of Hebrew descent; one whose religion is
 
Judaism; an Israelite." It goes on to say that originally
 
the Jew was considered to be:
 
a Hebrew of the kingdom of Judah, as opposed to those
 
of the ten tribes of Israel; later, an Israelite who
 
adhered to the worship of Jehovah as conducted at
 
Jerusalem. Applied comparatively rarely to the
 
ancient nation before the exile but the commonest name
 
for contemporary or modern representatives of this
 
group, now spread throughout the world. The word
 
"Jew" is also applied to groups, e.g. the Falashas in
 
Ethiopia, not ethnically related to persons of the
 
main European groups, the Ashkenazim and the
 
Sephardim. ("Jew," OED 228)
 
Though Marx deals with reiigion in this essay it is with
 
a jaundiced eye. In the introduction to the "Contribution to
 
the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'," published a
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 year later, he writes "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed
 
creature, the sentiment Of a heartless world, and the soul of
 
soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people" (54).
 
Marx holds no religion in high regard. Instead he writes in
 
"On the Jewish Question" of the nature of things. "The
 
Christian State, by its very nature, is incapable of
 
emancipating the Jew" ("Question" 27).2 m paraphrasing
 
Bruno Bauer, Marx says, "the Jew, by his very nature cannot
 
be emancipated" (27). Again, citing Bauer, he writes, "'...he
 
is and remains a Jew, even though he is a citizen and as
 
such lives in a universal human condition; his restricted
 
Jewish nature always finally triumphs over his human and
 
political obligations'" (28).And still relying on Bauer to
 
help construct his own argument, Marx quotes him saying,
 
"'[The Jew] declares, by this separation, that the particular
 
nature which makes him Jewish is his true and supreme nature,
 
before which human nature has to efface itself" (40).
 
Like race, an exact definition of human nature is
 
problematic. "The Greeks--most notably Plato and Aristotle-­
introduced the notion of form, nature or essence as an
 
explanatory, metaphysical concept" ("Philos. Anthro.," Brit.
 
559). This kind of thinking was used to explain how animal
 
and plant species gave rise to like kind and could not be
 
interbred. Man, setting himself apart from the flora and
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fauna by virtue of his intelligence, reason, use of tools,
 
and language, saw his nature as iiranutable--determined by his
 
place in the universe and destiny—-until the 15th century.
 
Certain Renaissance humanists declared, on the other hand
 
however, that man could take responsibility for his own
 
actions; in addition to his own nature, he had free will.
 
Further, during the 17th and 18th century Enlightenment, some
 
argued that man could develop morally and materially by using
 
reason. In the 19th century, with an emphasis on science,
 
other new disciplines arose; religion's influence began to
 
decline. An organic perception of man and nature was now
 
emphasized; man was no longer viewed outside nature but
 
within it. A fixed human nature was rejected while "[t]here
 
was a continued commitment to the perspective for the
 
individual, and his creative relation with the world"
 
("Philos. Anthro.," Brit. 566). Marx, a Romantic humanist,
 
held to this tenet coupled with the scientific application of
 
reason.
 
In "On the Jewish Question," where Marx first decries
 
religion's negative impact on society, he uses the Jew as the
 
focal point for blame, epitomizing capitalism and the culprit
 
for man's alienation from himself as a species-being.^ As we
 
have seen, he says the Jew elevates his nature above that of
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humanity, "... his restricted Jewish nature always finally
 
triumphs over his human and political obligations," thus
 
setting himself apart. Judaism is equated with capitalism
 
where "[m]oney is the jealous god of Israel" ("Question" 50).
 
The Jew is the "huckster," worshipper of Mammon, the egoist
 
whose "profane basis" is "practical need" and "self­
interest." "The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the
 
nationality of the trader, and above all of the financier"
 
(51). For Marx, Judaism is not merely a religion; Jews are,
 
by nature, capitalists, the bourgeoisie. Therefore, it will
 
never be enough for the Jew to renounce his religion--he can
 
not. The Jew is his religion--the religion the Jew.
 
According to Marx the inherent nature of the Jew is Judaism.
 
This will forever ban him from the final Marxian nation where
 
there is no need for rule of man over man, no private
 
property, no class relations. Property relations will be
 
abolished; there will be no exclusive relationships, no
 
jealousy, greed or crime as these are all products qf class
 
relations. The only barrier to realizing this Utopia is the
 
Jew. How is this to be actualized? Marx says, "In the final
 
analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of
 
mankind from Judaism" (49). "The social emancipation of the
 
Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism" (52).
 
How do we explain this virulent attack? We can ascribe
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it to prejudice, but that may be an oversimplification.
 
Gordon Allport, a leading contributor to the analysis of
 
prejudice, cites a wit as defining prejudice as "being down
 
on something you're not up on" (8). which is another way of
 
saying, "prejudice is: thinking ill of others without
 
sufficient warrant."'^ [Allport's emphases] while recognizing
 
that prejudice can also carry positive connotations, Allport
 
points out that with regard to ethnicity,^ prejudice is
 
generally conceived of as negative. He breaks down the
 
definition further by saying:
 
The phrase "thinking ill of others" is obviously an
 
elliptical expression that must be understood to
 
include feelings of scorn or dislike, of fear and
 
aversion, as well as various forms of antipathetic
 
conduct; such as talking against people,
 
discriminating against them, or attacking them with
 
violence. (7)
 
This helps to define the term, but what of its source?
 
It is a serious error to ascribe prejudice and
 
discrimination to any single taproot, reaching into
 
economic exploitation, social structure, the mores,
 
fear, aggression, sex conflict, or any other favored
 
soil. Prejudice and discriminatidn... may draw
 
nourishment from all these conditions and many others.
 
(Allport, Preface xii)
 
Since some people have no definable reason for their bigotry,
 
reason will never persuade them that it is unjustified. They
 
are also just as likely to dislike a group of people that
 
they have never encountered as one they have. As Leonard
 
Dinnerstein, author of Antisemitism in America, said in an
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online Voice of America interview:
 
I think certain things have been drilled into children
 
from childhood, such as the Jews killed Christ, there
 
are some stereotypes that are so deeply embedded in
 
the culture that I don't know when they will go away.
 
I hope eventually but I can't predict absolutely.
 
Karl Marx's prejudice took the form of anti-Semitism which
 
"simply means hostility towards Jews," as defined by
 
Dinnerstein,
 
[hjostility in thought or deed. Thoughts are
 
impossible to measure so it has to be hostility in
 
expressions or activities. We find that anti-Semitism
 
is just another example of hostility towards the
 
outgroup. (VGA Interview)
 
which brings us to the paradox: if you hate them, and the
 
"them" is like you, whom do you hate?
 
It is doubtful that we can wholly explain why Marx
 
thought the way he did. That his argument springs from
 
deepseated, numerous elements that he, himself, could not
 
verbalize is likely. Race and religion are issues that spawn
 
prejudice and have served as catalysts for segregation,
 
warfare and annihilation. To understand the venom of Karl
 
Marx's rhetoric, it is nedessary to acquaint oneself with the
 
psychologic ramifications of having been born Jewish in 19th
 
century Germany and the Jewish self-hatred this could have
 
engendered. What is more, his philosophic and historic
 
legacies cannot be overlooked. All are intricately interwoven
 
to create that entity that was Karl Marx.
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Jewish history is filled with pogroms and anti-Semitic
 
purges. Here and there it is also dotted with periods of
 
relative calm and at times Jews were even accepted by their
 
non-Jewish neighbors in the Diaspora.
 
On September 28, 1791, two years after the French
 
revolution and two years after legislators di^ew up the
 
preface to the French Constitution proclaiming the equality
 
of men, the General Assembly delegates, pressured by the
 
members of the Paris Commune, granted Jews full rights of
 
French citizenship.
 
In 1799 Napoleon rose to power. In a series Of political
 
moves that proved expedient to his burgeoning empire, he
 
courted and wooed the Jews. On September 3, 1806 he asked
 
them to create and convene a Sanhedrin--the Supreme Court of
 
the Jews—-defunct since the destruction of the Second Temple
 
in 70 C.E.. Playing upon his beneficent mien, as perceived
 
by the French Jews, Napoleon courted their influence with
 
their eastern brethren in Poland to provision his troops
 
there. In 1808, he declared Judaism an "official" religion of
 
France; the rabbis' salaries were set by the state and they
 
were regulated by "consistories," departmental associations
 
of Jewish laymen (Sachar 64)> So while the Jews were
 
accorded a modicum of recognition and freedom, they were now
 
state regulated.
 
'l4;;
 
Following his takeover of the continent. Napoleon set
 
about instituting formal constitutions after the French model
 
in each of the states. This boded well for the Jews of the
 
former Holy Roman Empire who, since 1792, had petitioned
 
their monarchs for equal rights. In the German states,
 
however, each Jewish petition was countered by a petition by
 
German citizens, "urging authorities to keep the Jews in
 
their ghettos" (Sachar 66).
 
Nonetheless, ghettos in the the German states were
 
destroyed and their inhabitants freed. In unoccupied
 
Prussia, Jewish emancipation did not occur until 1812, and
 
then it was only partial as they could not hold state
 
offices. Prussian Jews were still viewed with suspicion
 
despite their having taken part in military action against
 
the French, many distinguishing themselves in action—even
 
receiving the Iron Cross (Sachar 68).
 
Following Napoleon's Waterloo, conservatism seized
 
Europe with the populace embracing a return to the pre-

Napoleonic period. In Italy, Austria, Hungary and Galicia
 
Jews were once again relegated to ghettos. They were
 
harassed, had special taxes imposed upon them, and were
 
forced to take humiliating oaths in law courts. In Germany—
 
both in Prussia and the former Confederatioh of the Rhine—
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 Jews were even more greatly oppressed.
 
Immanuel Fichte and Georg Hegel, preaching what became
 
known as romantic conservatism, "deduced from the past that
 
the welfare of the State-Leviathan took precedence over the
 
happiness of individuals" (Sachar 102). To put oneself and
 
one's needs before the state's was tantamount to treason.
 
Between 1815 and 1840 there was a radical return to
 
nationalism in the German states and with it came renewed
 
hatred of the Jews.
 
Frederich Riihs of the University of Berlin and Wilhelm
 
Ries of the University of Heidelberg offered anti-Semitism an
 
intellectual rationale. They viewed the Jewish minority as a
 
"'state within a state," as a "menace to the welfare and
 
character of the Germans'" (qtd.in Sachar 103).
 
Further complicating the period was the public's growing
 
fascination with science. Scientists "chose to assume that
 
matter was the source of everything in the universe,
 
including life and consciousness. Everything else was either
 
an illusion or else a subjective impression which could be
 
'reduced' to material fact" (Barzun, DMW 9). Scholars
 
hastened to ground everything in fact.
 
Arising within this historical milieu was Karl Herschel
 
Marx. His father, Herschel ha-Levi Marx, was a successful
 
Jewish lawyer who "came from a long line of distinguished
 
■ . ' .1^6' 
rabbis" (Kamenka xiii). After studying jurisprudence and
 
becoming an "enlightened Deist and liberal Kantian" (Kamenka
 
xiii), though formally remaining a Jew, Herschel returned to
 
Trier where his father and elder brother were rabbis. In a
 
Jewish ceremony, Herschel Marx married Henriette Pressborck,
 
the "daughter of a rabbi from Nijmegen in Holland, whose
 
ancestors had been rabbis in Hungary" (Kamenka xiii). Of the
 
nine children born to them only Karl and five sisters
 
survived.
 
Karl was born on May 5, 1818 in Trier, located in a
 
province of the Rhine "liberated" by the Prussians from
 
France. Sometime between 1816 and 1817, Karl's father was
 
baptized into the Evangelical established church of
 
the kingdom of Prussia...seven years later, on 24
 
August 1824, Karl Marx [age 6](with his five sisters)
 
stood at the baptismal font. In 1825,; after both her
 
parents had died, Marx's mother finally went through
 
the ceremony of baptism. (Kamenka xiii-xiv)
 
While some biographers have suggested that this
 
conversion was due to the elder Marx's Deist/Enlightenment
 
convictions, more recent study has shown that Prussian
 
legislation forced Herschel to choose between his law
 
practice as State Legal Counsellor in Trier, and remaining a
 
Jew (Kamenka xiv). In 1815, Herschel Marx wrote to the
 
Governor-General requesting that the laws applying solely to
 
Jews be annulled, identifying himself as a believer and
 
member of the Jewish coiranunity.
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In 1816 the President of the provincial Supreme Court
 
interviewed Heinrich [Herschel] Marx and recommended
 
that he and two Other Jewish officials be retained in
 
their posts and that the King grant them the special
 
exception....The Prussian Minister of Justice failed
 
to recommend such an exception. (Kamenkaxiv)
 
No evidence exists indicating the extent of Jewishness
 
in Herschel Marx's household and many researchers refute
 
those who suggest that the elder Marx was anti-Semitic. Much
 
writing and correspondence exists though, showing Karl Marx's
 
vehement and hostile attitude toward Jews and Judaism. Marx
 
viewed Ferdinand Iiassalle® (a fervent anti-Semite, though
 
Jewish himself, and a socialist who became Marx's opponent
 
within the revolutionary movement) as the "'most unGreek of
 
all the water-pollack Jews/' He is 'Itzig.' His books stink
 
of garlic. But mainly he is that 'Jewish Nigger, Lassalle'"
 
(206). In a letter to Friedrich Engels, Marx continues his
 
"impression of the external nature of the Jew as typified by
 
Lassalle";
 
Always this constant babble with the falsely excited
 
voice, the unaesthetic, demonstrative gestures, the
 
didactic tone...And also the uncultivated eating and
 
the horny lust of this "idealist." It is now
 
completely clear to me that, as his skull shape and
 
hair prove, he is a descendant of those Blacks who
 
accompanied Moses on the exodus from Egypt. (If his
 
mother or grandmother on his father's side did cross
 
with a nigger.) Now this combination of Jewishness
 
and Germanness upon the Black basic substance must
 
bring forth a strange product. (Gilman 206)
 
That Marx, who was dark complected and nicknamed "Moor,"
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 (Kamenka 345) should disparage Lassalle on the basis of his
 
heritage and color is ironic and yet in keeping with Marx's
 
penchant for denigrating in others what was inherent in
 
himself.
 
This form of diatribe is also reflected in "On the
 
Jewish Question" where Marx poses rhetorical questions
 
regarding Judaism and Jews and then supplies the answers,
 
"What is the profane basis Of Judaism? Practical need,
 
self-interest. Vlhat is the worldly cult of the Jew?
 
Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money" (48).
 
At the same time there appears a strong ambivalence in
 
Marx when we compare his actions to his words, in 1871
 
Mikhail Bakunin^ writes of Marx, praising his intelligence
 
and work as a scholar, especially in economics, and his love
 
for the cause of the proletariat. He lauds Marx for being the
 
"chief inspirer" of the founding of the International.^ But
 
then he points out what he views as Marx's faultss
 
Marx is extremely vain, a vanity which causes him to
 
descend to filth and madness. This is strange in so
 
intelligent and honestly devoted a man and can only be
 
explained by his education as a German scholar and a
 
man of letters and particularly by his nervous Jewish
 
character....Himself a Jew, he has surrounded himself
 
in London and France but above all in Germany, with
 
crowds of minor, more or less clever, scheming, glib,
 
speculating Jews. Like Jews everywhere else, they are
 
banking or commercial a.gents, literary people,
 
political people, correspondents for newspapers of all
 
shades..!.(Bakunin 117-19)
 
Bakunin's own prejudices notwithstanding, we see Marx as a
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man who, on the one hand, vilifies Jews while, on the other,
 
surrounds himself with them. The man was an enigma, and it
 
would not be too far fetched to assume he was tormented. As
 
David McLellan puts it in his introduction to Karl Marx;
 
Interviews and Recollections;
 
The whole frsunework of Marx's existence was penetrated
 
by profound structural contradictions. He was a Jew
 
living in a Christian culture. He was a German living
 
in London. He was a socialist living in a bourgeois
 
society, (xii)
 
Eugene Kamenka confirms McLellan's conclusions and moves into
 
the realm of psychology when he states in his introduction to
 
The Portable Karl Marx;
 
[I]n Marx's childhood Character, in his sharp tongue,
 
strong cimbition, and frequent aloofness—
 
characteristics that stayed with him for much of his
 
life--we do find some evidence of an underlying
 
insecurity and distress, so frequently linked with
 
equivocal status, (xiv-xv)
 
We can readily see this "equivocal status" made manifest
 
by the conversions to Christianity in Marx's household. By
 
Jewish rabbinic law, if one is born to a Jewish mother, one
 
is Jewish, regardless of later conversions by either the
 
mother or her offspring. The Evangelical Church, however,
 
would view the Marx family as Christian. Jews in Prussia had
 
the option declaring allegiance to their religion or they
 
could adapt to their surroundings. Herschel Marx's forlorn
 
attempt to remain faithful to his religion and heritage
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illustrates that the alternative to adaptation was not
 
promising. The Marx family was not unique. Many Jews, with
 
the advent of the Enlightenment and emancipation, moved to
 
the cities where they did not have to bear close scrutiny by
 
Orthodox Jews. Also, by this time, central-European Judaism
 
had become rigid. The new, secular Western culture was
 
seductive. The Jews "were willing to go to almost any length
 
to prove themselves worthy of citizenship, even, in the case
 
of some, if it meant sacrificing their religious
 
identification" (Sachar 140).
 
What arose from this "psychic insecurity" was Jewish
 
self-hatred. In an attempt to move into the Prussian drawing
 
rooms of the aristocrats and intelligentsia and have them, in
 
turn, as guests, Jews began to struggle against that which
 
they saw as an obstacle to full acceptance by Prussian
 
society—their Jewishness. As Moritz Goldstein wrote in 1912
 
in the journal Per Kunstwart "We Jews administer the
 
intellectual property of a people which denies us the right
 
and the ability to do so" (qtd. in Arendt 30).
 
Howard Morley Sachar relates the dilemma of Rahel Levin
 
a "brilliant salon Jewess." She entertained the most original
 
minds in Germany at the time in her home. She had a unique
 
ability to discern new talent, being the first "to introduce
 
Goethe and Ranke to the literary world." She was called,
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 "the most gifted woman of the universe, a seeress With the
 
influence of a Pythia, the first modern woman of German
 
culture" (14X). She was, however, desperately unhappy due
 
to, as she viewed it, the misfortune of having been born
 
Jewish. In writing to a friend she sayss
 
How loathsomely degrading, how offensive, insane and
 
low are my surroundings, which I cannot avoid. One
 
single defilement, a mere contact, sullies me and
 
disturbs my nobility. I imagine that just as I was
 
being thrust into this world a supernatural being
 
plunged a dagger into my heart with these words: "Now,
 
have feeling; see the world as only a few can see it,
 
be great and noble...But with one reservation: be a
 
Jewess!" (qtd. in Sachar 141).
 
In 1814, after marrying a thirty-year-old Christian writer
 
and diplomat (thirteen years her junior), she was baptized a
 
Lutheran the same day (Sachar 141).
 
while some Jews fled their heritage by conversions,
 
others did not seek salvation in such maneuvers. They, like
 
Moritz Goldstein, Franz Kafka and Walter Benjamin born more
 
than two generations later, preferred instead to forge
 
ahead, "to discover new ways of dealing with the past"
 
(Arehdt 38)
 
not because they believed in "progress" and an
 
automatic disappearance of anti-Semitism or because
 
they were too "assimilated" and too alienated from
 
their Jewish heritage, but because all traditions and
 
cultures as well as all "belonging" had become equally
 
questionable to them. (Arendt 36).
 
We can see vestiges of this dilemma and Rahel Levin's
 
self-loathing in Marx, himself, in his 1841 poem (written two
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years before "On the Jewish Question") in a Berlin literary
 
magazine, Athenaeum.
 
The Player
 
The player strikes up on his violin,
 
His blond hair falling down.
 
He wears a sword at his side.
 
And a wide, wrinkled gown.
 
"0 Player, why playest thou so wild?
 
Why the savage look in thine eyes?
 
Why the leaping blood, the soaring waves?
 
Why tearest thou thy bow to shreds?"
 
"I play for the sake of the thundering sea
 
Crashing against the walls of the cliffs.
 
That my eyes be blinded and my heart burst
 
And my soul resound in the depths Of Hell."
 
"0 player,why tearest thou thy heart to shreds
 
In mockery? This art was given thee
 
By shining God to elevate the mind
 
Into the swelling music of the starry dance."
 
"Look now, my blood-dark sword shall stab
 
Unerringly within thy soul.
 
God neither knows nor honors art.
 
The hellish vapors rise and fill the brain.
 
Till I go mad and my heart is utterly changed.
 
See this sword—the Prince of Darkness sold it to me.
 
For he beats the time and gives the signs.
 
Ever more boldly I play the dance of death.
 
I must play darkly, i must play lightly.
 
Until my heart and my violin burst."
 
The player strikes up on his violin.
 
His blond hair falling down.
 
He wears a sword at his side.
 
And a wide, wrinkled gown. (Payne 59-60)
 
The title itself Can be interpreted as an equivocation.
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It can mean the player of a musical instrument, in this case,
 
the violin; it can be construed also as one who is acting or
 
playing a role; a player can also be someone involved in a
 
game. Which of these players is Marx? The God-given art that
 
the speaker refers to "to elevate the mind" but which the
 
player uses instead "to tear [his own] heart to shreds in
 
mockery" may be Marx's own writing and his venomous, caustic
 
ability with words, which he then uses to "stab unerringly
 
with [the] soul" of his interlocutor, while at the same time,
 
he destroys himself.
 
Goethe was one of Marx's favorite poets (see Appendix
 
'A'), so it is not difficult to connect the allusion to the
 
player's purchase of the sword from the Prince of Darkness to
 
the pact in Faust.
 
In the poem, we can only guess as to the roots of the
 
protagonist's tortured self-hatred. As for Marx, himself, it
 
seems that his race, his religion, his Jewish origins may
 
explain much in his writing and his conflicted personality.
 
Gerhart Saenger writes in his 1953 book The Social Psychology
 
of Prejudice that many Jews, having resisted suppression for
 
generations, resign themselves to accepting prejudice. Those
 
Jews who still resist are viewed by the resigned, as
 
troublemakers. It is better, in the resigned's view, to
 
24
 
avoid bringing anti-Seiaitism to public awareness.
 
Furthermore, they believe that anti-Semitism is brought on by
 
the behavior of those troublesome Jews; if all Jews behaved
 
as they, themselves, did, anti-Semitism would cease to exist.
 
The "bad" Jews are responsible for the "good" Jews not being
 
accepted by the majority. The "good" Jews now feel that they
 
have more in common with the majority by sharing the majority
 
prejudice. The "good" Jew now feels superior to the other
 
Jews. From a psychological standpoint, this allows him an
 
outlet for his aggression "resulting from discrimination as
 
well as from his inability to escape the situation due to his
 
resignation but also additional support for his self-esteem"
 
(Saenger 30). Saenger goes on to point out the devastating
 
consequences of this self-hating pattern:
 
From here it is only one step toward releasing the
 
accumulated hostility toward members of one's own
 
group or other minorities. Jews become anti-

Semites...The price, however, which the minority
 
member pays for such neurotic outlet is the inability
 
to identify with his own group. Rejected by the
 
majority and by the minority such individuals are
 
often quite isolated. (30-31)
 
Saenger recommends that instead of becoming resigned to the
 
discrimination that the individual take overt action against
 
the prejudice—even to the point of militant action. This
 
produces a better adjusted individual (31).
 
In Jewish Self-Hatred, Sander Oilman explains why this
 
strategy is not only the best of two options but probably the
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only practical solution. He contends that as the minority
 
member attempts to adapt to the majority/ the majority
 
views his actions as "The more you are like me/ the more I
 
know the true value of my power, which you wish to share, and
 
the more I am aware that your are but a shoddy counterfeit,
 
and outsider" (2). It is an ever moving target, an
 
unachievable goal.
 
The power rests with the determining majority. "One
 
cannot escape these labels [ethnic, religious or class
 
identity] because of the privileged group's myth that these
 
categories are immutable" (Oilman 4). if one is to circumvent
 
the "power," one must change the rules. Myths cannot be
 
eradicated; they must be supplanted. One must create a new
 
myth. Marx tried. By attacking religion:—"the opium of the
 
masses"—he attempted to change the myth. Unfortunately, to
 
do so, he had to demonize his origins.
 
I must play darkly, I must play lightly.
 
Until my heart and my violin burst.
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CHAPTER TWO
 
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS: FORMS, FALLACIES AND FIGURES
 
What's in a name? That which we call a
 
^ , rose ■ ■ 
By any other name would smell as sweet. 
William Shakespeare
 
In the classical tradition rhetoric meant "the art of
 
persuasive speaking." Rhetoric originated 2,400 years ago in
 
the courts of Syracuse in arguments over property, and it is
 
ironically fitting that Karl Marx should use rhetoric to
 
propound his doctrine advocating the freeing of humans from
 
their dependence upon property. Later, rhetoric Came to
 
encompass written disGourse as well and has since undergone
 
changes along with a deepening understanding of human nature
 
and language. Developments in history, culture, psychology,
 
literature, and philosophy have also served to shape modern
 
rhetorical strategies and study. However, three types of
 
appeals, first identified by Aristotle, have remained
 
indispensable to modern rhetoricians: logos, ethos and
 
pathos. Of these respective appeals Aristotle said.
 
The man who is to be in command of them must, it is
 
clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to
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understand human character and goodness in their
 
various forms, and (3) to understand the emotidns-­
that is, to name and describe them, to know their
 
causes and the way in which they are
 
excited.(Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book 1, 154)
 
While the classical rhetoricians may have disapproved of the
 
emphasis upon pathos, and many, like Plato, despised
 
rhetoric, preferring the dialectic with its emphasis on
 
logos, pathos' power to sway people cannot be denied.
 
Kenneth Burke says, in "Rhetoric-^Old and New," that
 
modern rhetoric hinges upon the principle of "identifi
 
cation," which, though a deliberate device like the
 
persuasion of "old" rhetoric, "can include a partially
 
/unconscious' factor in appeal" (63). He elaborates further
 
on this concept by saying,
 
identification can also be an end, as when people
 
earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group
 
or other. Here they are not necessarily being acted
 
upon by a conscious external agent, but n\ay be acting
 
upon themselves to this end. In such identification
 
there is a partially dreamlike, idealistic motive,
 
somewhat Compensatory to real differences or divisions
 
which the rhetoric of identification would transcend.
 
("Rhetoric--Old and New" 63)
 
Identification, therefore, is the process by Which speakers
 
get themselves accepted by an audience. That audience, in
 
turn, suspends its logic (in the Aristotelean sense) to
 
follow along. The new rhetoric exploits this.
 
Roland Barthes, another modern rhetorician, includes
 
"ludic" as one of his six practices in rhetoric.^ He defines
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it as a mockery of rhetoric that developed naturally in
 
response to the repressiveness of rhetoric's institutiohal
 
system. It is, he continues,
 
a "black" rhetoric (suspicions, contempt, ironies):
 
games, parodies, erotic or obscene allusions,
 
classroom jokes, a whole schoolboy practice (which
 
remains to be explored moreover, and to be constituted
 
as a cultural code). (Barthes 14)
 
Ludic is a cognate for "play," and play's derivation is
 
readily apparent in that both it and ludic are defined as
 
opposition to work, irony, parody.
 
This multi-faceted concept of "ludic/play," as noted in
 
Marx's poem "The Player" in the last chapter, and Burke's
 
"identification" and the psychological ramifications of both
 
for Marx, personally, carry forward into our rhetorical
 
examination of Marx's non-fiction prose, specifically "On the
 
Jewish Question," adding other dimensions to our
 
comprehension of the essay and its motivation.
 
The darker side of "play" can be found in anti-Semitic
 
literature. In "The Passion of the Anti-Semite" (1948),
 
Jean-Paul Sartre discusses just this point.
 
Anti-Semites have the right to play. They even like
 
to play with discourse for by giving ridiculous
 
reasons, they discredit the seriousness of their
 
interlocutors. They delight in acting in bad faith,
 
since they seek not to persuade by sound argument but
 
to intimidate and disconcert. (148)
 
Sartre, philosopher, political essayist and activist,
 
argues that anti-Semitism is not an idea but a passion, pne
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which he equates with hysteria. He says that historically
 
the hatred of Jews has not been based upon "an 'historical
 
fact' but the idea that the agents of history formed for
 
themselves of the Jew" (146). In refuting the view that
 
"social facts" indicate that, for example, there are too many
 
Jewish lawyers, Sartre says that one doesn't hear a like
 
complaint that there are "too many Norman lawyers" or that
 
there are too many Breton doctors. His point is that
 
"Normans are [considered] Normans and Jews as Jews" (147).
 
It is, he continues, "the idea of the Jew which seems to be
 
the essential thing" [Sartre's emphases](147). Lest we
 
confuse the passion of anti-Semitism with the passions of
 
hatred and anger, Sartre cautions that hate and anger must
 
have a provocation; someone must instigate the anger/hatred.
 
Anti-Semitism, on the other hand, "precedes the facts that
 
are supposed to call it forth" (147). He reasons that it is
 
not unusual for people to prefer passion to reason; usually
 
they love the objects of passion but as the anti-Semite
 
chooses hate it must be the state of passion that he loves.
 
Marx is certainly a man of passion, we have seen it
 
demonstrated in his poem "The Player" (see above, page 23).
 
Anti-Semitism is prevalent throughout "On the Jewish
 
Question," and we see his violent hatred directed at Lassalle
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(see above, page 18). We also learned of the historical
 
circumstances that shaped his world, McLellan's and Kamenka's
 
assessments attest to Marx's equivocal status in society (see
 
above, page 20) and Saenger an Oilman confirm his deep Jewish
 
self-hatred (see above, pages 24-26). Yet Marx's writings
 
also reveal a man of reason. Like the man, they are greater
 
than the sum of the parts.
 
Classically educated from the local gymnasium through
 
five years at the University of Berlin, he had developed his
 
ability to use language to manipulate audiences in both the
 
classical and modern sense. Marx's doctoral dissertation,
 
entitled "The Difference Between the Democritean and
 
Epicurean Philosophies of Nature" (1839-41), voiced his
 
"Promethean revolt." "By liberating the world from the
 
unphilosophical condition, men at the same time liberate
 
themselves from philosophy, which in the form of a definite
 
system has held them in fetters" (qtd. in Lewis 33). This
 
passage demonstrates Marx's use of the classical figure,
 
polyptoton, the use of a repeated word or root in different
 
grammatical functions, i.e. liberating, liberate. Arthur
 
Quinn points out in Figures of Speech, it is a technique used
 
frequently in aphorisms as in Epicurus', "Nothing is enough
 
to the man for whom enough is too little." Quinn suggests
 
that it is successful because it is not readily recognizable
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as a figure and therefore makes the adage seem "strikingly
 
original" (74). (It is not surprising that Marx uses
 
polyptoton/ a technique favored by Epicurus--whose philosophy
 
was the focus of Marx's dissertation.) Such rhetoric would
 
serve Marx well.
 
while Marx relied heavily upon rhetorical strategies, he
 
touted the dialectic--with, of course, his own modifications.
 
The word "dialectic" has accrued many meanings over the
 
centuries so it is worthwhile, here, to slow our argument to
 
discuss the different conceptions. Originally, the
 
Aristotelean dialectic and that of the classical Greek
 
scholars, "us[ed] rigorous syllogistic logic to approach
 
probable truths in questions about human affairs and
 
philosophy that do hot?lend themselves to absolute certainty"
 
(Bizzell and Herzberg 4). In modern usage, the dialectic has
 
become a "philosophical Concept of evolution applied to
 
diverse fields including thought, nature, and history"
 
("Dialectic," Brit. 63). When applied philosophically by
 
Kant, the dialectic shows "the mutually contradictory
 
character of the principles of science, when they are
 
employed to determine objects beyond the limits of experience
 
(i.e. the soul, the world, God)" (OED, "Dialectic" 599).
 
Between these two definitions rests the Hegelian dialectic:
 
"The tendency of a notion to pass over into its own negation
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as the result of conflict between its inherent contradictory
 
aspects" ("Dialectic^" Brit. 63). Hegel denied Kant's
 
position that the contradictions of science were
 
irreconcilable. Instead he maintained that the term
 
"dialectic" applies:
 
(a) to the process of thought by which such
 
contradictions are seen to merge themselves In a
 
higher truth that comprehends them; and (b) to the
 
world-process on its objective side, develops
 
similarly by a continuous unification of opposites.
 
(OED "Dialectic" 599)
 
Marx adopted Hegel's definition but revised it through
 
the application of Ludwig Feuerbach's "'transformational
 
criticism...inverting its principle propositions" (Tucker
 
xxii).H Instead of the Hegelian belief that the course of
 
events could be deduced from any "principle of dialectics,"
 
Marx said that the principles must be inferred from the
 
events, matter over mind. This gave rise to the Marxian
 
theory of dialectical materialism, according to whidh
 
political events or social phenomena are to be
 
interpreted as a conflict of social forces (the "class
 
struggle") produced by the operation of economic
 
causes, and history Is to be interpreted as a series
 
of contradictioris and their solutidfls (the thesis,
 
antithesis, and synthesis of Hegelian philosophy).
 
(OED, "Dialectical," 600)
 
Marx's collaborator, Friedrich Engels, described this
 
dialectical process as the being like the planting of a
 
cereal seed (thesis), which is annihilated as the plant grows
 
(antithesis) and, in developing, a causes its own extinction
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in the production of new seeds (synthesis). Marx considered
 
this to be the universal law of nature, history and thought.
 
The fundamental change between Hegel's and Marx's view
 
of the dialectical process is one from "spirit" (Hegel) to
 
"material" (Marx).
 
Marx relished "turning Hegel on his head." In "A
 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" Marx takes
 
Hegel's view, that civil society was an outgrowth of the
 
state, and says instead that the state was an outgrowth of
 
civil society. In referring to the Hegelian dialectic in the
 
Afterword of the second German edition of Capital, Marx says,
 
"With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned
 
right side up again, if you would discover the rational
 
kernel within the mystical shell." (Tucker, Intro. The Marx-

Engels Readerfxx-xxi).
 
in Stanley Fish's highly specialized view, he describes
 
the dialectic presentation as
 
disturbing, for it requires of its readers a searching
 
and rigorous scrutiny of everything they believe in
 
and live by. it is didactic in a special sense; it
 
does not preach the truth, but asks that its readers
 
discover the truth for themselves, and this discovery
 
is often made at the iexpertse not only of a reader's
 
opinions and values, but of his self-esteem.(Fish 1-2)
 
The intent is to force the audience into reevaluation and
 
change. The end product of this dialectical experience "is
 
(or should be) nothing less than a conversion" (Fish 2).
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The antithesis, according to Fish, is rhetoric, making
 
"lies and impieties attractive...indue[ing] forgetfulness and
 
complacency" (15). So what are we to make of Marx, who mixes
 
his rhetorical and dialectical presentations?
 
Marx attempts Fish's "conversion" by vehemently trying
 
to dissuade his audience from embracing religion altogether.
 
And while Marx is guilty of "pander[ing] to his audience's
 
immediate desires" (Fish 15-16), he utilizes the definitive
 
dialectic form to:
 
transform []the soul-mind into an instrument capable
 
of seeing things in the phenomenal world for what they
 
really are (turning things upside down), imperfect and
 
inferior reflections of a higher reality whose claim
 
on our thoughts and desires is validated as earthly
 
claims are discredited. (Fish 7)
 
Certainly, in its final extreme, the socialist/communist
 
world Marx envisioned was other-worldly, manifesting a
 
"higher reality," a Utopia that is not credible given man's
 
generally self-serving attitude. Yet, Marx did not stop with
 
Hegel in "turning things upside down" to attempt to achieve
 
his world view. In his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, Marx
 
says, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in
 
various ways; the point is to change it" (145). This could
 
be considered Marx's raison d'etre. Calling for "a ruthless
 
criticism of everything existing" in a letter to Arnold Ruge
 
in 1843, his writings reflect his critical and revolutionary
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attitudes directed toward social reality. It is not too far
 
fetched then to postulate that in defying tradition by
 
inverting Hegel and blending the rhetorical approach with the
 
dialectic, Marx was mirroring his ideology.
 
Not limiting himself to the larger components of written
 
expression, Marx also uses inversion at the level of
 
sentences.
 
Marx poses the question "What specific social element is
 
it necessary to overcome in order to abolish Judaism?"
 
[Marx's emphasis] ("Jewish Question" 48). He then suggests,
 
"Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion, but
 
let us seek the secret of the religion in the real Jew'*
 
("Question" 48). Using antimetabole, a form of antithesis
 
repeated in opposite order (Quinn 93), and clearly aligning
 
himself with his audience against the Jews, Marx presents us
 
with an idea and then its inverse--an antithesis. Antithesis
 
and antimetabole are more than interesting uses of language;
 
they allow for repetition and accumulation--two fine didactic
 
techniques'—by denying the contrary and asserting it (Quinn
 
93). Marx uses this technique extensively in his essay to
 
press home his point.
 
Thus man was not liberated from religion; he received
 
religious liberty. He was not liberated from
 
property; he received the liberty to own property. He
 
was not liberated from the egoism of business; he
 
received the liberty to engage in business.("Question"
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Besides using antimetabole, Marx also alters the passive
 
voice to the active as he moves from the first clause to the
 
second in each sentence. But instead Of implying that man is
 
the doer, Marx conditions the action by saying "he
 
received..." and through the repetition of the same phrase,
 
"he received. emphasizes man's subjugation.
 
In the first section of the essay, Marx makes his case
 
against religion, specifically against Judaism, paraphrasing
 
Bruno Bauer, whose essays "The Jewish Question" and "The
 
Capacity of Present-Day Jews and Christians to Become Free,"
 
are the proximate cause for Marx's essay. Marx begins by
 
condemning Jews as egoists. "You Jews are egoists if you
 
demand for yourselves, as Jews, a special emancipation"
 
("Question" 26). Again, Marx's aritimetabole sets the Jews
 
up as adversaries of the German people. "Why should the
 
German be interested in the liberation of the Jew, if the Jew
 
is not interested in the liberation of the German" (27).
 
Then he stresses that the Jews set themselves apart, not only
 
from the German people, but Christians as well. "The Jew
 
himself in this state, has the privilege of being a Jew. As
 
a Jew he possesses rights which the Christians do not have"
 
(27). Marx is very clever in weaving his own interpretations
 
through Bauer's words. He haphazardly uses quotation marks,
 
sometimes attributing quotes, sometimes paraphrasing,^^ This
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makes it difficult, at this juncture, to ascertain whose
 
words are whose. Later in the essay, however, Marx allows
 
his own no-longer-camouflaged voice to surface. He uses
 
Bauer as a whipping boy for not having taken his argument far
 
enough. Bauer stopped short of defaming all religion, and
 
did not require that society be purged of all Jews.
 
Marx's tone comes through in his style. He makes ample
 
use of italics, even in quoting from Bauer's essays, and
 
his choice of nouns, adjectives and modifiers all emphasize
 
his defamatory agenda.
 
When we move our rhetorical investigation from the level
 
of sentences to that of words, we see Marx uses words to
 
great effect. Some examples are: "right of property," "right
 
of self-interest," "private interest," ''private caprice,"
 
"monad, "nature,^' and any and all forms of the word "ego."
 
These words are used to imply oppositions between the
 
individual and society as a whole, distinguishing between the
 
general rights of man and the specific rights of the citizen.
 
Marx says that man's individual rights keep him from being at
 
one with the community of man.
 
But it is the word "Jew," its variations, and Marx's
 
repeated use of it as an epithet that is striking. Jews are
 
"egoists," there is "the privilege of being a Jew." "'[T]he
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Jew by his very nature, cannot be emancipate.' and '...his
 
restricted Jewish nature always finally triumphs over his
 
human and political obligations.'"^^
 
"He regards himself as a member of the Jewish people,
 
and the Jewish people as the chosen people." "[A] Jewish
 
attitude, i.e., that of a foreigner, towards the state" keeps
 
him forever apart.
 
Gordon W. Allport points out in The Nature of Prejudice
 
that "a noun abstracts from a concrete reality some one
 
feature and assembles different concrete realities only with
 
respect to this one feature" [Allport's emphasis] (174-75).
 
He uses Irving Lee's example of a blind man who may be many
 
other things—^a good student, careful listener, conscientious
 
worker'—but because he is also a blind man he is stigmatized
 
by that noun [Allport's emphasis]. He calls this a symbol of
 
"primary potency"—a label that "distracts our attention
 
from concrete reality. The living, breathing, complex
 
individual...is lost to sight" (175-76). Allport goes on to
 
say that the force of the noun's primary potency may be
 
mitigated if used as an adjective, e.g. Jewish artist, Negro
 
soldier. Catholic teacher, whereby other group
 
classifications are just as legitimate as the racial or
 
religious (176) and the more attributes used tO describe an
 
individual the better, suggesting that "we designate ethnic
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and religious membership wherie possible with adjectives
 
rather than nouns" (177).
 
Marx rigorously avoids the use of the word Jew/Jewish as
 
an adjective; he has no desire to mitigate the connotations^
 
One exception is "the practical Jewish spirit" (50), but he
 
uses another adjective, "practical," not to conciliate but to
 
heighten the negative impact as he has already argued that
 
practicality is synonymous with self-interest and
 
huckstering. These are all Jewish traits and all are anti
 
social.
 
But while in the first section of his essay, there
 
appears to be a less specific attack on Jews and a more
 
general one on the condition of mankind as a whole, in the
 
second portion he equates Jews and Judaism with the monad,
 
the egoist, and the financier to demonstrate they are one and
 
the same and consequently anathema to society and true human
 
emancipation.
 
Marx finally disassociates himself from Bauer's Jewish
 
question criticism by stating that is only a theological
 
criticism as in Germany "there is no political state, no
 
state as such...The Jew finds himself in religious opposition
 
to the state, which proclaims Christianity as its foundation"
 
(30). When no state religion exists and when it "ceases to
 
maintain a theological attitude toward ireligibn," the Jewish
 
Question becomes one of politics and not theology (29-31).
 
Marx then poses the question, "What is the relation between
 
complete political emancipation and religion?" and sets up
 
the hypothetical syllogism that if a country has full
 
political emancipation and religion continues to exist, then
 
the "existence of religion is not at all opposed to the
 
perfection of the state, but since the existence of religion
 
is the existence of a defect, the source of the defect must
 
be sought in the nature of the state itself" ("Questioh" 31).
 
He thus makes the point that theological questions must be
 
addressed as secular ones and not the reverse. This reflects
 
the Hegelian inversion discussed earlier (page 34) and also
 
is a technique of accumulation and an antithesis (Quinn 67).
 
Marx goes on to state that man, by still adhering to a
 
religion in the private and civil sector in a secular state,
 
is a "profane being" ("Question" 34). "The democratic state,
 
the real state, does not need religion for its political
 
consummation" ("Question" 37).
 
Marx felt that Bauer erred in relegating religion to
 
individual worship; the state must abolish religion not only
 
from its political life but it must be abolished from the
 
civil or private life, as well. Worth noting is the implicit
 
totalitarian position Marx takes on the subject of all
 
religion'. And it can be argued that his positibn on Jews was
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hardly different than that on Christians. Marx says that
 
"Christianity issued from Judaism. It has now been re­
absorbed into Judaism" (52) But he blames Jews for their
 
corrupting influence. He argues that,
 
It was only in appearance that Christianity overcame
 
real Judaism. It was too refined, too spiritual to
 
eliminate the crudeness of practical need except by
 
raising it into the ethereal realm.
 
Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism;
 
Judaism is the vulgar practical application of
 
Christianity. ("Question 52)
 
Marx, nevertheless, singles but Jews and Judaism:
 
We do not say to the Jews, therefore/ as does Bauer:
 
ybu cannot be emancipated politicaliy without
 
emancipating yourselves completely from Judaism. We
 
say rather: it is because you can be emancipated
 
politically, withbutrsnoUhbing Judaism completely and
 
absolutely, that politicai Smancipatibh itself is not
 
human emancipation. ("Qnestipn" 40)
 
What is the reason for this exblUsivity?
 
In the second part of his essay, Marx quotes Bauer as
 
saying that it is simply a matter of the Christian "'ris[ing]
 
above his religion to abolish religion in general...[the Jew]
 
has to break not only with his Jewish nature, but also with
 
the process towards the consummation of his religion'"(47).
 
Marx contests this view by again saying that Bauer's
 
theological take simply relegates the question of Jewish
 
emancipation a matter of religion. He chastises Bauer saying
 
this "demand does not follow, as he himself admits/ from the
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development of the Jewish nature" (47).
 
After shattering Bauer's premises (or at lea.st
 
manipulating them to serve his rhetorical purposes), and
 
supplanting them, in the first half of the argument, with his
 
own, Marx now builds towards his conclusion. He contends
 
that Jewishness, being at the crux of Bauer's examination of
 
the Jews' request for political emancipation in Germany, is
 
not solely a religion. He says that Bauer is mistaken in
 
attempting to address the issue theologically. But Marx
 
uses Bauer as support for his claim when he says:
 
Bauer regards the ideal and abstract essence of the
 
Jew—his religion—as the whole of his nature. He,
 
therefore, concludes rightly that 'The Jew contributes
 
nothing to mankind when he disregards his own limited
 
law,' when he renounces all his Judaism. (47)
 
Marx claims that Bauer's errot lies in believing that the
 
Jews' essence is their religion rather than their inherent
 
nature. Yet here, he has used Bauer's own words as both
 
support and refutation.
 
For Marx, the foots of .Judaism are more than cultural,
 
more than a product of materials, they are nature.
 
But this runs counter to Marx's conventional argument-­
dialectical materialism—whereby conditions produce the man.
 
If we formulated Marx's argument in "On the Jewish
 
Question" as a syllogism it would look something like this:
 
Major Premise: 	 All anti-social elements must be
 
removed from society for it to succeed.
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Minor Premise 
(implied): [The Jew's, by nature, are set apart, 
anti-social.] 
Conclusion: Jews must be removed from society for
 
it to succeed.
 
While this is a startling argument in its bare-bones
 
formulation, Marx is careful to cloak it in layers of clever
 
rhetoric and convoluted phrasing. Using the enthymeme and
 
its implied premise to distort perceptions, he sets up the
 
Jew's nature as the less defensible straw man and then
 
destroys it and uses genetic fallacy to attack the cause of
 
the Jew's belief rather than its justification. Marx does
 
not offer a logical opposition but rather a rhetorical one.
 
Marx defies his own philosophical dictates. He uses
 
faulty logic. He relies on fallacies and rhetorical figures.
 
These are not the tools of a logical or prudent individual.
 
Yet we know Marx to be one. Why does he deviate?
 
If we recall Sartre's appraisal (see above, pages 29­
30), "they seek hot to persuade by sound argument but to
 
intimidate and disconcert," a plausible answer emerges. Marx
 
is in the thrall of passion. But this only explains his
 
vehemence; it does not excuse it.
 
In an effort to dehumanize the Jew, Marx uses as his
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premises the most hackneyed stereotypes; Jews are
 
"hucksters," money and Mammon are the "gods of the Jew." He
 
states the "nationality of the Jew" to be that of the trader
 
and the financier. He invites his audience to draw
 
comparisons, albeit implied, between money (property) and
 
Jews. Building on this false analogy, he demonstrates that
 
thfey are inseparable; both are responsible for man's
 
alienation from his natural and emancipated being. Marx
 
demonstrates that the Jewish religion and the Jewish nature
 
are indivisible and that their nature is capitalistic.
 
Marx begins a telling passage with:
 
Let us Consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew,
 
whom Bauer considers, but the everyday Jew. [Marx's
 
emphases] ("Questioh" 48)
 
Omitting the dependent, practically parenthetical Clause
 
"whom Bauer considers,'' he employs the figure of repetitive
 
ends, epistrophe, concluding each clause with "Jew."
 
Why does Marx resort to stereotypes? Because they work.
 
They work because people believe in them. Stereotypes lead to
 
prejudice. Aristotle calls this "indignant language" and
 
says that
 
when we paint a highly colored picture of the
 
situation without having proved the facts of its...if
 
the prosecutor goes into a passion, he produces an
 
impression of the defendant's guilt...the hearer
 
infers guilt or innocence, but no proof is given, and
 
the inference is fallacious accordingly. (Rhetoric
 
Marx's passage cdntinues with the previously examined
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paragraph with its antimetabole (see above, page 36):
 
Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion,
 
but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real
 
Jew.("Question" 48)
 
which is then followed by:
 
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
 
need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the
 
Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.
 
("Question" 48)
 
The repeated use of identical clause beginnings, anaphora,
 
used here: "What is..." in this question-answer format is
 
deceptively childlike in its simplicity but effective in its
 
repetition. These three paragraphs offer a different
 
rhetorical figure, yet all are a form of repetition and it is
 
this repetition, drumming the litany into the reader that
 
helps Marx make his point. The Jew is the consummate
 
Capitalist and thus the quintessehtial egoist. His solution
 
and the attainment of human emancipation, therefore, can only
 
be achieved by mankind's emancipation from Judaism
 
("Question" 49-52), Capitalism creates religions, but
 
according to Marx, only the Jews worship (or make a religion
 
of) capitalism. This behavior is the problem with Jewish
 
liberation. He further states that:
 
Judaism could not create a new world. It could only
 
bring the new creations and Conditions of the world
 
within its own sphere of activity, because jiractical
 
need, the spirit of which is self-interest, is always
 
passive, cannot expand at will, but finds itself
 
extended as a result of the continues development of
 
society. ("Question" 51)
 
46
 
Marx makes an obvious, though implied comparison between
 
Judaism and parasitism, emphasizing greed and selfishness.
 
These were commonly held beliefs in 19th century Europe and
 
it was not beneath Marx to use ad populum fallacy to
 
sidetrack his audience, appealing to favored ideas, values,
 
or symbols as a means of winning assent to a claim without
 
confronting substantive issues. But, in this case, as he
 
had already supplied the premise—that the Jew's belief was
 
caused by greed—-it makes the argument doubly specious.
 
Marx'siheavy reliance upon informal fallacies would be
 
considered illogical and unethical. Rhetorically, however,
 
these means work to justify his ends. As Socrates tells
 
Phaedrus, "he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his
 
attention upon probability. A speaker must always aim at
 
probability, paying no attention to truth" (qtd. in Bizzell
 
139). Additionally, Marx uses what Aristotle called
 
enthymemes and"non-essentials," personal appeals arousing
 
prejudice, pity and anger (Bizzell 151).
 
Moving to the language of modern rhetoric, Marx also
 
utilizes Burke's identification (see above, page 28):
 
"anything that anyone does—^verbally or non-verbally,
 
consciously or unconsciously, for persuasion (the old
 
rhetoric) or for identification (the new rhetoric)...[as] a
 
rhetorical strategy" (Burke 59).
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Marx exploits this principle by placing himself clearly
 
on the side of the "non-Jews" while encouraging his audience
 
likewise to join him. Yet, Who was Marx's audience?
 
A member of the Young Hegelians, and the Doktor Klub,^^
 
Marx was one of a group of "critical young thinkers, who
 
poured contempt on the church, on the bourgeoisie and even on
 
the state" (Lewis 23). Chosen to edit the Rhenish Gazette
 
(1842) by its founders, Cologne merchants and bankers, Marx
 
moved to Cologne, When the journal was censored and
 
suppressed in early 1843, Marx "retired" briefly, and in
 
November moved to Paris. It was about this time he wrote "On
 
the Jewish Question." Also, with the financial backing of
 
Arnold Huge he became co-editor of The German-French Yearbook
 
(November, 1843). This was yet another in a series of
 
"journalistic enterprises undertaken by German radicals in
 
the 1830s and i840s" (Gilman 192). The the backers, writers
 
and readership were Jewish. As they had difficulty
 
publishing their work in Germany, and were denied access to
 
the politics there, they wrote and published in France. As
 
radical idealists striving for identification the primarily
 
Jewish, Young Hegelians wrote for their non-Jewish countrymen
 
only to be denied acceptance. Their work was restricted to
 
those who shared their views and perceived by the rest of the
 
world as "Jewish and foreign"(Gilman 193).
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Adhering to revolutionary demagoguery while appealing in
 
part to a hoped-for Christian constituency/ Marx writes in
 
"On the Jewish Question" (as discussed above, see page 42),
 
"Christianity issued from Judaism. It has now been re­
absorbed into Judaism....Judaism is the sublime thought of
 
Judaism; Judaism is the vulgar practical application of
 
Christianity"(52). Marx's implication is clear; Judaism's
 
parasitic nature could not exist, flourish, without
 
Christianity—the host~yet remains fully culpable as
 
Christianity is only an extension of Judaism. Furthermore,
 
Christianity allows Judaism to taint it with "practical need
 
and egoism." As such, society has been corrupted and, in
 
such a state, man cannot realize his true emancipation. The
 
inevitable conclusion, if we accept Marx's premises, is that
 
for man to become a true socialist—a species-being at one
 
with his fellow man--the Jew must be removed from society.
 
"The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of
 
society from Judaism" iMarx, "Question" 52)^
 
This final argument is the final line of Marx's essay.
 
Instead of the syllogism, with its supposed-to-^be-true
 
general premise followed by a substantiating minor premise
 
leading to a rigidly deduced conclusion, Marx uses the
 
enthymeme with a probable premise and missing minor premise
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to create a tentative conclusion. This allows him to
 
expertly declare his own view to his audience rather than
 
guide them to "right thinking." Marx has used a variation of
 
this passage four pages earlier. (We can again see evidence
 
of his use of repetition to emphasize his point.)
 
In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews
 
is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. (49)
 
The implied premise, in both cases, is that there exists an
 
anti-social element in the Jews that must be expunged before
 
mankind's emancipation can take place. Marx also equivocates
 
with the word "emancipation"; in the one sense it means
 
liberation; sui juris, having full legal rights and capacity,
 
and in the other deliverance, which carries the added
 
connotation of riddance. It is the preposition "from" that
 
promotes the latter interpretation.
 
Similarly, Marx employs what Burke calls "spiritual­
ization ... a grand device, central to polemic. Which is
 
forever translating back and forth between materialist and
 
idealist terms for motives" (Burke 76), used most effectively
 
here to persuade his readers that the Jews' materialistic
 
nature is what keeps them and, by their influence, the rest
 
of society from attaining the ideal emancipation.
 
Marx declares that the Jews are "by nature" Capitalists.
 
Yet if we look at his original premise in "The German
 
Ideoldg'y," we see that he, applying "scientific socialism,"
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states that humans originally were conscious producers only
 
in the sense that they produced their means of subsistence,
 
which at the dawri of time did not include money. "what they
 
are...coincides with their production, both what they produce
 
and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus
 
depends on the material conditions determining their
 
production" (150). This assertion supplies support for the
 
contradictory claim that the Jew cannot "by nature" be
 
"hucksters," for their nature, like the rest of humanity's,
 
was determined prior to any need for finance. Also, human
 
history when examined shows that the Jews, who antedated many
 
of the non-Jewish populations in Europe and whose communities
 
had existed long before the rise of Christianity, were,
 
however, isolated and relegated to ghettos in Christian
 
Europe because they were feared as "Christ-killers." This
 
was an imposed autonomy, forced upon them, certainly not a
 
natural or self-elected separation. As they were cut off
 
from property ownership, agriculture and "respectable"
 
commerce they turned to other means Of support (Sachar 25­
35). Frequently, the only acceptable "profession" was
 
bank^ing ancl lending, somethihg considered "unclean" by
 
surrounding Christian societies. The restrictive lifestyles
 
and heavy taxes imposed upon them in and out of the ghetto
 
caused Jews to become prudent and thrifty. They limited
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their possessions to goods they could carry due to the
 
frequent arrogation of their hoines and furnishings by various
 
regimes. Againf this forced adaptation is not elemental
 
human nature but the means of Survival in a prejudiced state.
 
It can be argued that relying on "The German Ideology"
 
for support is questionable as Marx and Engels wrote it in
 
1845-46, several years after Marx wrote "On the Jewish
 
Question" (1843). Marx may have mellowed, his rhetoric in
 
the earlier essay was perhaps misconstrued or, as Shlomo
 
Avineri suggests in "Marx and Jewish Emancipatiort," his
 
primary argument was the philosophical argument with Bauer.
 
Though Avineri admits Marx loathed Judaism, he suggests that
 
in Marx's return to the subject of Jewish emancipation in
 
the The Holy Family. he modified his harangue to focus on
 
the political aspect of Jewish emancipation (while still
 
adhering to the firm conviction that it is at core a question
 
of human emancipation). Avineri points to Marx's support for
 
those Jewish writers who took issue with Bauer's contentions
 
that the Jewish question was a religious rather than a
 
political one as support for his claim that Marx had a bigger
 
picture in mind. In interpreting The Holy Family and backihg
 
Marx, Avineri says:
 
It seems that Marx makes it quite explicit, that he is
 
concerned here not only with the inner contradictions
 
of an attitude which would like to deny the Jews equal
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rights in a modern society, but is out to claim those
 
very rights for the Jews himself. (450)
 
He reminds us that Marx's goal, given his "Feuerbachian,
 
anthropological attitude to religion"(447) and his
 
recognition of the limits of political emancipation, in the
 
essay (and by implication, that in "On the Jewish Question")
 
are not ultimate. He concludes by saying that ''One has to
 
divorce Marx's acrimonious attack on the role Jews played"
 
(450). Why? TO better serve Marxism?
 
Marx may have backed off in his vehemence, as Avineri
 
suggests; what cannot be denied is the attack itself and
 
Marx's obvious anti-Semitic stance in "On the Jewish
 
Question." Perhaps, having written it, Marx determined his
 
argument was too strident (at Engels' urging?) for his
 
audience and refocused it in The Holy Family. That
 
investigation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, at
 
the risk of being accused of using the genetic fallacy, I
 
have to believe that Mr. Avineri's contentions may be colored
 
with a certain self-serving bias, given what I presume to be
 
his socialist philosophical and political agenda.
 
If one still chooses to overlook the obvious anti-

Semitism in Marx's "On the Jewish Question" and replace "Jew"
 
and "Judaism" with "Capitalist" and "Capitalism," it becomes
 
obvious that his scapegoating is directed at the materialism
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and egoism of the present society and how it is embodied not
 
only in Judaism but in all religion. To ultimately rid man
 
of the propensity for egoism, man must be rid of all
 
religion; a point he expresses. But then why single out
 
Judaism? We have already ruled out racism (see above, pages
 
7-8); Marx knew little if anything of the biology of race.
 
Robert Tucker points out in a footnote to his translation of
 
"On the Jewish Question" that "the German word Judentum
 
[Judaism] had, in the language of the time, the secondary
 
meaning of 'commerce,'" (50) and that Marx exploited the two
 
senses of the word. The Jew served Marx's purposes
 
rhetorically and historically as the proverbial scapegoat.
 
As previous investigation of the psychology of Jewish self-

hatred has shown, Marx and many others chose to deny their
 
heritage as an act of self-preservation; this may explain, in
 
part, his use of fallacious ad-hominum arguments directed
 
against Jews.
 
Another explanation for Marx's less-than-well-reaSoned
 
argument may be supplied by Sartre who sees the rational man
 
as one who "gropes for the truth" ("Passion" 148). This type
 
of individual realizes the provisional nature of his own
 
reasoning. But there are also those who "are attracted to the
 
durability of stone" (148), those who despise change. Such
 
persons have a fear of themselves and truth, subordinating
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reason and research, seeking only what has already been
 
found, becoming only what already was. "This is nothing but
 
passion" (148). Anti-Semites have chosen hate as a faith,
 
Sartre contends, thereby devaluing words and reasons. They
 
know the absurdity of their words and attacks but leave it to
 
their adversaries, who, through their belief in words, are
 
compelled to use them responsibly.
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 CHAPTER THREE
 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
 
Proper words in proper places, make the
 
true definition of a style.
 
Jonathan Swift
 
Without knowing the force of words, it is
 
impossible to know men.
 
Confucius
 
To understand more fully Marx's essay, we must unite our
 
understanding of the circumstances of his life and culture to
 
the words he uses and the way he chooses to use them. To
 
accomplish this I have chosen to employ two divisions of
 
discourse analysis; stylistics and pragmatics.
 
Discourse analysis is, as Teun van Dijk states, "both an
 
old and new discipline" (1). Whereas linguistics arose from
 
the grammatica and its "normative rules of correct language
 
use" (1), discourse analysis stemmed from rhetorica, sharing
 
rhetoric's concern for persuasive effectiveriess. In today's
 
world, however, it is:
 
used to describe activities at the intersection of
 
disciplines as diverse as sociolinguistics, psycho­
linguistics, philosophical linguistics and compute­
tional linguistics.'' (Piefhce, Brown and Yule viii)
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Some see this overlap as ari aid to rhetorical analysis in
 
that these disciplines utilize examinations that are
 
generally viewed, relative to the analyses practiced by the
 
humanities, as more "scientific." Its real strength lies in
 
allowing microanalysis of areas of textual use heretofore
 
interpreted solely by rhetorical modes and by the figures of
 
speech.
 
Stylistics
 
In the past, rhetorical analysis of literature has dealt
 
with authorial intent and examination of works utilizing
 
figures of speech such as anaphora, ellipsis, metonymy,
 
synecdoche, and, as we have already seen, Marx's favorite,
 
antimetabole. These figures are all well and good and
 
analysis of their use helps literary critics to wade through
 
texts interpreting and extrapolating. But there is something
 
missing from their analysis. While critics could rely upon
 
their "good instincts" and cite similar and/or prior Use of
 
forms to explain rhetorical style and its power to persuade,
 
what lay behind or within the persuasive tools? Arthur
 
Quinn, in Figures of Speech, states that "Writing is a matter
 
of making linguistic choices, and reading depends upon under-

Standing the linguistic choices made by someone else" (5).
 
An overlap exists between rhetoric and linguistics which
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plays out in our discussion of "figures" and discourse
 
analysis. As has been demonstrated, Marx's rhetorical skill
 
is formidable; his power to persuade, compelling. What I
 
wanted to analyze and hopefully understand was how he
 
achieves this impact stylistically.
 
Much of the early part of Marx's essay is taken up by
 
direct quotes from Bruno Bauer's essays, "The Jew"ish
 
Question" and "The Capacity of Present-Day Jews and
 
Christians to Become Free," as well as paraphrases of Bauer's
 
writings and others', notably Hegel and Alexander Hamilton.
 
I have chosen not to analyze these portions. While they,
 
too, are indicative of, from both a rhetorical and linguistic
 
standpoint, Marx's stylistics, I choose instead to examine
 
the writing which was strictly his.
 
There is a climactic build in many of his passages,
 
frequently prefaced by seemingly rhetorical questions as well
 
as a liberal use of italics supplied by Marx. For instance:
 
Or do the Jews want to be placed on a footing of
 
equality with the Christian subjects? If they
 
recognize the Christian state as legally established
 
they also recognize the regime of general enslavement,
 
why should their particular yoke be irksome when they
 
accept the general yoke? Why should the German be
 
interested in the liberation of the Jew, if the Jew is
 
not interested in the liberation of the German?
 
("Question" 26-27)
 
Echoing the technique of classical rhetoric known as erotema
 
in Greek, the two concluding rhetorical questions are used as
 
58
 
no answers are expected and only one answer can reasonably be
 
made for either. "Writers who use a rhetorical question save
 
themselves the trouble of offering further evidence to
 
support their claims" (Barnet and Bedau 78). In the first,
 
the obvious answer is that Jews should not find a
 
"particular" yoke irksome. And the second, relying on a
 
forced hypothesis—that the Jew is not interested in the
 
liberation of the German--pushes the reader to conclude that
 
on this basis, the German should not be concerned with the
 
Jew's liberation.
 
As we saw in the rhetorical analysis chapter, Marx
 
relies on antimetabole here, reversing the structural order
 
of the sentence and negating the Jew's interest in the final
 
question. Both the principles of end-focus and climax are
 
used to present the new information Marx wanted to convey as
 
well as create a dramatic effect, while disenffanchising Jews
 
from Germans. The italicized "Gh^^istian" set up an opposition
 
with the non-italicized "Jew." Finally, his questions
 
following the antecedent, "If they recognize the Christian
 
state as legally established..." are more like the "then"
 
consequences of a conditional hypothetical syllogism than
 
pure rhetorical questions, further forcing the hypothesis.
 
Marx's use of cohesive devices such as juxtaposition.
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expressive repetition, and various forms of croSs-reference
 
abound. In arguing the rights of the citizen as distinct
 
from the rights of man as put forth in the "Declaration of
 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,"^® he employs them to
 
act as synonyms and add emotive heightening.
 
Feudal society was dissolved into its basic element,
 
man; but into egoistic man who was its real
 
foundation. ("Question" 45)
 
Man, here, becomes Synonymptjs with egoistic man, a cross-

reference. He italicizes man and egoistic, the technique of
 
segmentation, to further emphasize his point. In the next
 
sentence he repeats the word man, carrying with it this new
 
connotation:
 
Man in this aspect, the member of civil society, is
 
not the foundation and presupposition of the
 
political State. He is recdgnized as Such in the
 
rights of man. ("Question" 45)
 
Two pages previously in his essay, Marx has alleged that
 
"...the political liberators reduce citizenship, the
 
political community, to a mere means for preserving these
 
so-called rights of man" (43). He is employing the principle
 
of climax—building toward something. The words man and
 
political are again repeated, but we recognize them now with
 
their negative connotations intact. Furthermore, the repeated
 
italics not only heighten emotion but act pedagogically, as
 
seen in the rhetorical analysis, to inculcate the reader with
 
his, Marx's, position.
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In the next paragraph Marx supplies a new definition of
 
man's liberty.
 
But liberty of egoistic man, and the recognition of
 
this liberty, is rather the recognition of the
 
frenzied movement of the cultural and material
 
elements which form the content of his
 
life.("Question" 45)
 
He violates the principle of end-focus in the following
 
paragraph, below, by placing the new information first,
 
stating, "Thus man was not liberated from religion...." and,
 
having redefined liberty, he can now equivocate. And as we
 
saw in the rhetorical examination, where he exploits the
 
repetitive figures antimetabole and antithesis (see above,
 
page 36), we see here that he ignores the linguistic
 
principle of reduction, repeating the words "he received" and
 
"liberty" with variations thereof. The repetition serves to
 
persuade and convince rather than dull the senses through
 
redundancy.
 
Thus man was not liberated from religion; he received
 
religious liberty. He was not liberated from
 
property; he received the liberty to own property. He
 
was not liberated from the egoism of business; he
 
received the liberty to engage in business.("Question"
 
45)
 
Though abandoning end-focus with respect to the sentence
 
embedded in the paragraph, he uses the paragraph itself as
 
the end-focus of his argument, demonstrating that man is a
 
passive recipient, "a bourgeois," rather than an active agent
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or citizen of the state.
 
Despite apparent divergences, we should not lose sight
 
of the fact that the crux of Marx's argument is still
 
supported by anti-Jewish premises.
 
Marx begins "On the Jewish Question":
 
The German Jews seek emancipation. What kind of
 
emancipation do they want? Civic, political
 
emancipation. (26)
 
The first sentence ends with the word "emancipation." It is
 
repeated in the second graphic unit—a question, and again in
 
the third graphic unit (a graphological sentence but not a
 
syntactic one; devoid of both subject and verb), where it
 
again receives end-focus. The information Marx presents in
 
the first sentence is a given: that German Jews seek
 
emancipation. In the second sentence he poses a question
 
only to be answered with the ostensibly new information that
 
they want civic and political emancipation. But he does not
 
even bother with the coordinating conjunction "and" between
 
"civic, political—also a rhetorical figure called
 
asyndeton, which Arthur Quinn Suggests promotes brevity and
 
organic unity (7-8)—-making it all the more emphatic
 
syntactically. Furthermore, beginning the essay with these
 
short simple sentences, he sets up his entire argument in
 
this half of the essay while delivering a combination punch
 
with an italicized climactic ending. Italics, as Geoffrey
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Leech and Michael Short note, are a "special device used
 
expressively to give the flavour of spoken emphasis" (213).
 
The use of simple sentences, coming at the beginning of the
 
essay coupled with the end-focus and climax principles within
 
the first paragraph, imparts a forceful manner. The pronoun
 
substitution—"they" for "German Jews"--and abrupt
 
punctuation in the example above both convey an emphatic
 
Style that would not be prevalent if the sequencing and
 
segmentation had been rearranged.
 
Marx uses a variation of the same style seen above in
 
the following passage:
 
The most stubborn form of the opposition between Jew
 
and Christian is the rellgipus opposition* How is an
 
opposition resolved? By making it impossible. And
 
how is religious opposition made impossible? By
 
abolishing religion. ("Question" 29)
 
Again he uses the question/answer format, and with the use of
 
iconicity--the imitation principle—he not only implies that
 
the cause, religion, precedes the effect, opposition, he
 
also presents a hypothetical syllogism which is apparently
 
"valid" and thus an ostensibly irrefutable argument.
 
Nonetheless, the premises Marx uses are not only questionable
 
but force the hypothesis; hence the argument is not sound.
 
Other cohesive devices frequently employed by Marx in
 
his essay are cross-references and linkages. Moreover, his
 
blatant use of juxtaposition, deictics, substitution, formal
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repetition, 'elegant' variation, coordinating conjunctions
 
and linking adverbials all point to a not-to-well-hidden
 
agenda:
 
Judaism has been preserved, not in spite of history,
 
but by history.
 
It is from its own entrails that civil society
 
ceaselessly engenders the Jew.
 
What was, in itself, the basis of the Jewish religion?
 
Practical need, egoism.
 
The monotheism of the Jews is, therefore, in reality,
 
a polytheism of the numerous needs of man, a
 
polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of
 
divine regulation. Practical need, egoism, is the
 
principle of civil society, and is revealed as such
 
in its pure form as soon as civil society has fully
 
engendered the political state. The god of practical
 
need and self-interest is money.
 
Money is the god of Israel, beside which no other god
 
may exist. Money abases all the gods of mankind and
 
changes them into commodities. Money is the universal
 
and self-sufficient value of all things. It has,
 
therefore, deprived the whole world, both the human
 
world and nature, of their own proper value. Money is
 
the alienated essence of man's work and existence;
 
this essence dominates him and he worships it.
 
The god of the Jews has been secularized and has
 
become the god of this world. The bill of exchange is
 
the real god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory
 
bill of exchange.("Question" 50)
 
In these examples, Marx again combines the simple sentences
 
with the complex, presenting seemingly rhetorical questions
 
which he then answers. He breaks the sentences into
 
paragraphs lending further emphasis to them. Besides the
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italicized words, which Marx has endeavored to represent as
 
similar if not synonymous in the reader's mind, it is his
 
juxtaposition of ideas and words, evoking connections between
 
two otherwise unconnected elements, however, which is
 
striking in this passage. In the sentence, "It is from its
 
own entrails that civil society ceaselessly engenders the
 
Jew," he is sayihgf that civil society gives birth to Jews
 
through its bowels, thereby implying that the Jew is not only
 
spawned in an unclean manner but is also synonymous with
 
excrement, in the fifth paragraph begihhittg"Money is the
 
god..." Marx equates "money" with the "god of Israel," (which
 
is already an elegant variation for the god of the Jews). He
 
then defines money's negative connotations, eschewing the use
 
of "it" for the time being, instead, he begins each of the
 
next three sentences with "Money," then Uses the definite
 
cross-reference "It" to link Jewishness to the now scorned
 
"money." Then, with the linking adverbial "therefore," he
 
implies that money/Jews are responsible for "depriving the
 
whole world...of their own proper value." In the final
 
sentence, again reverting to the use of "Money" as the
 
initial word, he concludes with a powerful, climactic ending.
 
Earlier in this series of examples Marx says, "...a
 
polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of divine
 
regulation." Marx is knowledgeable of the Talmud and the
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Bible. He refers here to an orthodox Jewish injunction that
 
one should give thanks for all God's graces, including the
 
ability to continue in good health and disposition through
 
natural elimination. He uses what can only be construed as
 
insider knowledge to ridicule and demean Jews and Jewish
 
practices. He employs the device again when he says,
 
That which is contained in an abstract form in the
 
Jewish religion-^contempt for theory, for art, for
 
history, and for man as an end in hiniself--is the
 
real, conscious standpoint and the virtue of the man
 
of money. Even the species^relation itself, the
 
relation between man and woman, becomes an object Of
 
commerce. Woman is bartered away. ("Question" 51)
 
The reference this time, "an object Of commerce," is to the
 
ketubba, or marriage contract, in which men agree to pay a
 
settlement of a specified amount Of money to their wife or
 
her family in the event the marriage results in divorce.
 
Combining end-focus in each of the sentences: "man of
 
money," "object of coinmerce," "bartered away" with the
 
hypothetical syllogism; where if A then B, if B then C,
 
therefore, if A then C, Marx uses the principle of climax to
 
coerce the reader into concluding that the Jew, who has no
 
real redeeming social value as he is contemptuous of
 
everything artistic and creative in mankind except money,
 
is--in the name of money—even willing to sell his wife.
 
Besides divulging his ihtimate knowledge of Jewish
 
tradition, Marx's use of "Even" at the beginning of the
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second sentence as an adverbial link that signals something
 
of even greater contrast will be forthcoming, persuades the
 
reader to believe that what follows is not only negative but
 
reprehensible. His deictic use of "that" to begin the
 
sentence is used in a reductive sense to refer first, to the
 
"contempt for theory, etc." and second, and perhaps more
 
importantly, to reduce through a condescending tone that
 
which is abhorrent, e.g., "That one—the one who did all the
 
damage."
 
Throughout the essay, Marx weaves into his argument ad
 
hominem attacks upon the Jews. As was pointed out earlier in
 
the examinations of rhetorical figures, these occurrences
 
become more frequent and virulent in the second half of the
 
paper:
 
Let us consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew,
 
Whom Bauer considers, but the everyday Jew.
 
Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his religion,
 
but let us seek the secret of the religion in the real
 
Jew.
 
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
 
need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the
 
Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.
 
Very well: then in emancipating itself from
 
huckstering and money, and thus from real and
 
practical Judaism, our age would emancipate itself.
 
An organization of society which would abolish the
 
preconditions and thus the very possibility of
 
huckstering, would make the Jew impossible.
 
("Question" 48)
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Relying on anaphora (repetition of beginnings: "Let us...")/
 
antimetabole (repetition in opposite order which is also a
 
negation: "Let us not seek the secret of the Jew in his
 
religion, but let us seek the secret of the religion in the
 
real Jew") and epistrophe (repetition of endings: "Let us
 
consider the real Jew: not the sabbath Jew, whom Bauer
 
considers, but the everyday Jew") in their respective
 
paragraphs, Marx is able to shift the focus to the end of the
 
passage while repeating "Jew" again and again.
 
Marx does not want the reader to focus on the "sabbath
 
Jew;" implying the religiously correct individual; he wants
 
the attention focused on the "everyday Jew," one devoid of
 
religion and God. He knows his audience; if not primarily
 
Christian, they at least share his predisposition to dislike
 
and distrust Jews. He underscores all this by placing
 
"everyday Jew" at the end of the sentence and paragraph so it
 
receives end-focus.
 
In the third paragraph he asks three questions and then
 
supplies the answers as a single graphic unit minus the
 
subject and verb; "Practical need, self-interest";
 
"Huckstering"; "Money." This is the figure ellipsis—a
 
stylistic device whereby certain parts of a sentence are
 
omitted. In the first assertion: the basis of Judaism is
 
"practical need, self-interest," the conjunction is omitted,
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another example of asyndeton (as on page 62). These
 
omissions serve to move the reader along, speed things up.
 
They don't allow one to dwell or reflect. And once again the
 
end-focus principle makes his point emphatic. By italicizing
 
the words practical need, self-interest, huckstering and
 
money, a device called segmentation, Marx suggests emphasis
 
and intonation. The Jews' cult is "huckstering"; an
 
outgrowth of practical need. Their worldly god is "[m]oney";
 
the product of the huckstering. Here, Marx uses a crescendo-

like technique, the principle of climax, to substantiate the
 
claim.
 
Haying achieved metonymic substitutions--the reader now
 
reads "money" and/or "huckster" for Jew/Judaism and vice
 
versa—Marx builds upon this groundwork to state in the
 
fourth and fifth paragraphs that to emancipate itself the
 
"age" must emancipate itself from money and consequently,
 
Jews. Venturing further, he says that the society freed from
 
the conditions which make huckstering possible would make
 
Jews impossible. But Marx's inductive argument implies that
 
"practical need and huckstering" are synonymous with Judaism.
 
This then raises the question, does Marx propose to get
 
rid of the hucksters/Jew. And, if so, is it possible to get
 
rid of Jews without physical annihilation? This is the
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Jewish Question.
 
Though is a cleverly constructed, linked argument, it is
 
unsound. Were his premises truthful, which again, as was the
 
case in the previous argument (see above, page 63), they are
 
not, it would not only be valid but sound.
 
Marx commits at least six fallacies;
 
(1) Ad hominem; arguing against a claim by attacking
 
the holder in irrelevant ways--the cult of the Jews
 
is huckstering;
 
(2) The genetic fallacy: attacking the cause of
 
someone's belief rather than its justification­
Judaism's basis is practical need/self-interest;
 
(3) Equivocation: a fallacy that turns on the
 
semantics of words—Jews/Judaism are equivalent to
 
self-interestf huckstering, money;
 
(4) Hasty generalizations: a conclusion drawn about an
 
entire population based on too small a sample-—all
 
Jews are this way;
 
(5) The straw man: in attacking an opponent's position
 
one attacks a less defensible similar but different
 
position—because some Jews are creditors, they are
 
self-serving usurers;
 
(6) The fallacy of the negative proof: whereby someone
 
argues that because we don't know if a certain
 
statement is true, then it is false or because we have
 
no proof that it is false, then it is true—the
 
abolition of money and moneylending would make
 
Judaism/Jews disappear.
 
These same techniques are apparent again in the example
 
below. Here, Marx casts aspersions on Christianity, as a
 
perfected off-shoot of Judaism, for alienating man from
 
himself and nature. The difference is that he Uses more
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complex sentences that serve to mitigate the strength of his
 
chastisement:
 
Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism;
 
Judaism is the vulgar practical application of
 
Christianity. But this practical application could
 
only become universal when Christianity as perfected
 
religion had accomplished, in a theoretical fashion,
 
the alienation of man from himself and from nature.
 
It was only then that Judaism could attain universal
 
domination and could turn alienated man and alienated
 
nature into alienable, saleable objects, in thrall to
 
egoistic need and huckstering. ("Question" 52)
 
Despite the appearance of his taking Christianity to task in
 
the first paragraph, he reverts to form once again, using the
 
backgrounding technique to highlight his climactic
 
foregrounding of Judaism as responsible for man's being held
 
in thrall to egoistic need and huckstering. J.E. Grimes
 
calls this climatic foregrounding, staging or thematization.
 
It occurs where
 
[e]very clause, sentence, paragraph, episode, and
 
discourse is organised around a particular element
 
that is taken as its point of departure. It is as
 
though the speaker presents what he wants to say from
 
a particular perspective, (qtd. in BrOwn and Yule 134)
 
This foreground is played against a background of what
 
Teun A. van Dijk calls the "ASSUMED NORMALITY of the world"
 
(qtd. in Brown and Yule 62). We, as readers or hearers,
 
"recognize types of communicative events which take place
 
against a background of a mass of below-conscious
 
expectatipns...based on paat experience" (Brown and Yule 62).
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All this allows the reader, in the case of Marx's essay, to
 
recognize the regularities inherent in this type of writing,
 
generalize from past exposure and predict the outcome or the
 
direction the argument will take. Readers, then, do not need
 
to pay attention to all that is written; it is enough to
 
gloss the material to get a general idea of how it relates to
 
past experience and "construct...the probable detail" (F.C.
 
Bartlett, qtd in Brown and Yule 63). This is also known as
 
presupposition, something we Will investigate further in the
 
pragmatics analysis.
 
Cultural stereotypes provide a source of corroboration
 
or embarrassment depending upon past experience. If, for
 
instance, a certain genre of joke is told, the hearer may or
 
may not know how to respond based upon whether he has heard
 
the same kind of joke before (Brown and Yule 63), or may not
 
"get" the joke at all. By the same token, if a reader's
 
background knowledge allows him to make presuppositions about
 
what is being read without a thorough reading, he may simply
 
miss certain references whether implicit or direct.
 
For Marx's audience, already predisposed to anti-

Semitic sentiment, the anti-Christian allusion may be
 
overlooked or be simply mildly troubling. To persuade the
 
more discerning reader, Marx uses words and phrasing that
 
belie the new information he presents: Christianity is the
 
sublime thought of Judaism; Ghristianity as perfected
 
religion; in a theoretical fashion.
 
In the following paragraphs, Marx reiterates much of
 
what he has said before throughout the essay. It is this
 
expressive repetition which Leech and Shbrt have said is
 
"expressive in that it gives emphasis or emotive heightening
 
to the repeated meaning" (Leech and Short 247). Repetition,
 
as we saw when we analyzed Marx's use of the rhetorical
 
figures antithesis and antimetabole (see above, page 36) is
 
also a frequently used didactic device to get readers to pay
 
attention.
 
In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is
 
the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. ("Question"
 
49)
 
The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the
 
nationality of the trader, and above all of the
 
financier. ("Question" 51)
 
In its perfected practice the spiritual egoism of
 
Ghristianity necessarily becomes the material egoism
 
of the Jew, celestial need is transmuted into
 
terrestrial need, subjectivism into self-interest.
 
The tenacity of the Jew is to be explained, not by his
 
religion, but rather by the human basis of his
 
religion-—^^practical need and egoism. ("Question" 52)
 
As soon as society succeeds in abolishing the
 
empirical essence of Judaism—^huckstering and its
 
conditions-^the Jew becomes impossible, because his
 
consciousness no longet has an object. The subjective
 
basis of Judaism--^practical need--assumes a human
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 form, and the conflict between the individual,
 
sensuous existence of man and his species-existence,
 
is abolished.
 
The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation
 
of society from Judaism. ("Question" 52)
 
Of special interest is the fact that the first paragraph and
 
the last are almost verbatim. The final paragraph is also
 
the last line of the essay. If the principal of end-focus,
 
the principal of climax, and repetition mean anything, then
 
this is not only Marx's conclusion but also his focus.
 
If we read the first and last paragraphs alone, could
 
Marx be advocating genocide, albeit implicity? He has
 
already constructed a powerful, though fallacious, argument
 
which could be construed as arguing for this interpretation.
 
But if we look at the fourth paragraph, where he states that
 
if society rids itself of the "empirical" or observable
 
"essence of Judaism," which he has already defined and does
 
so again as "huckstering," the Jew will become "impossible"-­
cease to exist. Does Marx mean cease to exist as a JeW/ or
 
as a living being? It may be inferred that it is simply
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enough to no longer sustain an economic nexus, which will in
 
turn cause Jews to fade away, having removed the object of
 
their consciousness. But then Marx says that the "subjective
 
basis of Judaism—-practical need—-assumes a human form." The
 
segmenting dashes place emphasis on the preceding words,
 
"Judaism" and "need," as they did in the foregoing sentence
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accentuating "Judaism" and "the Jews." But the phrase is
 
ambiguous. How does this transmutation take place? Is he
 
implying that heretofore Jews were/are not human? And when
 
he says "assumes a human form," he has not said whether this
 
form is still living. The iwpiication is that the barrier
 
between man as an individual and man as a species being will
 
be dissolved, but the circumstances by which this will be
 
achieved are unclear.
 
It can be argued that Marx is making a materialist
 
argument: Jews/Judaism are products of objective conditions.
 
Remove those conditions and you remove the product of those
 
conditions—the Jew. As we saw above, in Chapter Two (page
 
43), this is the conventional Marxist argument: "conditions
 
produce the man." But it is obvious that Marx chooses to
 
depart from his own conventional wisdom with respect to the
 
Jews. It is enough that we recall Marx's clash with Bauer
 
over Bauer's contention that the emancipation of the Jews is
 
simply a theological question rather than, as Marx would have
 
it, a question of Jewish "nature," or review his rhetoric:
 
Money is the jealous god of Israel; huckster;
 
worshipper of Mammon; the egoist whose 'profane basis'
 
is 'practical need' and 'self-interest'; The
 
chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality
 
of the trader, and above all of the financier; Jews
 
are 'egoists'; There is 'the privilege of being a
 
Jew'; '[T]he Jew by his very nature, cannot be
 
emancipate' and'...his restricted Jewish nature
 
75
 
always finally triumphs over his human and political
 
obligations'; He regards himself as a member of the
 
Jewish people, and the Jewish people as the chosen
 
people; [A] Jewish attitude, i.e., that of a
 
foreigner, towards the state keeps him forever apart
 
to see that Jews and Judaism elicit something less than
 
logical argumentative strategies from Marx.
 
In light of the principle of charity, Marx may have been
 
using an inductive argument. He is presenting "evidence"
 
hoping that his audience will make an inferential lea:p to the
 
conclusion: in order for the world to exist as a better
 
place it must be emancipated from Jews; Jews must Simply
 
cease to be. But it is an easy leap from "cease to be" to
 
"be eliminated" though one is passive and the other active.
 
Finally, focusing on the fifth arid sixth paragraphs of
 
the example, above, it could be and has been argued that
 
Marx's main argumentative thrust was not truly anti-Semitic.
 
If we view the bigoted remarks as merely emotiorial appeals, a
 
means to an end, convenient scapegoating, then the argumerit
 
might be considered a vilification of material wealth and
 
religion as a whole. In this case, Marx has made strong
 
arguments throughout the essay, but he equivocates at the
 
end. He leaves the reader to decide whether he is calling
 
mfeirely for mankind to disavow religion and money. Or Whether
 
he believes wholeheartedly that the Jews are the root of all
 
evil and should be eradicated.
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Through our investigative use of the end-focus
 
principle, principle of climax, segmentation, salience,
 
sequence, coordination and subordination and the cohesive
 
devices of cross-reference and linkage found in iconicity,
 
along with figures of speech and the rules of logic and
 
argument, Marx's anti-Semitism has been shown to be more than
 
implicit. Not only can it be demonstrated, but his use of it
 
to further a new philosophy is quite evident.
 
Marx ignores the general endophoric cohesive devices
 
whereby the reader looks either forward (cataphoric relation)
 
or backward (anaphoric relation) in the text for
 
interpretation of a deictic reference. He prefers to repeat
 
time and again what and who he is railing against--Judaism
 
and Jews. However, he does rely on exophoric relations.
 
This is "where the interpretation lies outside the text, in
 
the context of the situation...which plays no part in textual
 
cohesion" (Brown and Yule 192).
 
This is where the historical record and Marx's
 
psychological profile come into play. If we are to proceed
 
to a pragmatic analysis in an attempt to prove the implicit
 
call for genocide, we must understand not simply the words
 
but the behavior, beliefs and time. As we have seen,
 
rhetorical analysis is helpful, stylistics is illuminating
 
but alone does not serve our purpose, and the two together
 
do not provide sufficient evidence. We must understand the
 
discourse-as-process:
 
how a recipient might come to comprehend the
 
producer's intended message on a particular occasion,
 
and how the requirements of the particular
 
recipient(s), in definable circumstances, influence
 
the organisation of the producer's discourse. (Brown
 
and Yule 24)
 
Pragmatics
 
In his essay, "Foundation of Philosophical Pragmatics,"
 
Asa Kasher argues that a thorough grasp of language must not
 
separate the study of syntactical structures and semantical
 
relations from linguistic pragmatical theory. Syntax and
 
semantics, as we have seen from our investigation of rhetoric
 
and stylistics, combined with pragmatics constitute the warp
 
and woof of language. To study one without the other would
 
leave little on the loom. To continue the analogy, while the
 
underlying structure of the warp might exist, there could be
 
no visible pattern without the woof. And, conversely,
 
without the interwoven motif, what purpose does the
 
structure serve?
 
in any study of language, social factors come into play.
 
Pragmatics is specifically concerned with these social
 
factors. "The ultimate goal of any pragmatical theory—-is to
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specify and explain the constitutive rules of the human
 
competence to use linguistic means for effecting basic
 
purposes" (Kasher 226, author's emphases).
 
More specifically, pragmatics studies
 
the factors that govern our choice of language in
 
social interaction and the effects of our choice on
 
others. In theory, we can say anything we like. In
 
practice we follow a large number of social rules
 
(most of them unconsciously) that constrain the way we
 
speak. (Chen, "Pragmatics" 120)
 
The factors we will consider with respect to these social
 
rules are Speech Acts, Politeness, Presupposition,
 
Conversational Implicature and Deliberate Ambiguity.
 
While not breaking hew ground, the application of
 
pragmatic analysis to Marx's essay, as was the case with
 
stylistics earlier in the chapter, requires sOme adjustment
 
of the principles governing oral discourse and/or fiction. In
 
most cases, I have not edited the theorists' statements
 
regarding conversational discourse, judging them amendable to
 
written discourse; and I have made every attempt to be true
 
to the intent of these theorists in applying my analysis to
 
Marx's non-fiction prose.
 
Speech Acts
 
Speech acts are a central sub-domain of pragmatics.
 
Speech Act Theory originated with J. L. Austin's 1962
 
observations in How to Do Things with Words that while
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sentences can often be used to report states of affairS/ the
 
utterance of sortie sentences, such as;
 
I bet you two dollars it will snow today.
 
I christen this ship the Enterprise.
 
must, in some specified circumstances, be treated as the
 
performance of an act.
 
Austin described such utterances as performatives and
 
the specified circumstances required for their success he
 
outlined as a set of felicity conditions:
 
1. 	There must exist an accepted conventional
 
procedure, having a certain conventional effect,
 
which includes the uttering of certain words.
 
2. 	The particular persons and circumstances in a
 
given case must be appropriate for the invocation
 
of the particular procedure involved.
 
3. 	The procedure must be executed by the participants
 
correctly.
 
4. The procedure must be executed completely.
 
Austin's point is that in saying something, a speaker is
 
DOING something, i.e. performing a speech act. For example
 
when you say:
 
I promise to behave
 
you are not merely saying it; you are also promising at the
 
same time. "I promise" is the performative.
 
Marx, opting for the conventional third person point of
 
view, uses the inclusive "we" and "us" when he does adopt the
 
use of a pronoun. In every instance of the use of "we" there
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is also the use of an explicit performative:
 
We ask the converse question...(30)
 
We do not claim that they must transcend their
 
religious narrowness in order to get rid of their
 
secular limitations. We claim that they will
 
transcend their religious narrowness once they have
 
overcome their secular limitations. We do not turn
 
secular questions into theological questions; we turn
 
theological questions into secular ones.(31)
 
We criticize the religious failings of the political
 
state by criticizing the political state in its
 
secular form, disregarding its religious failings.
 
We express in human terms the contradiction between
 
the state and a particular religion, for example
 
Judaism, by showing the contradictions....(31-32)
 
The use of "we" and the concomitant performatives are used
 
almost exclusively in the first section of the essay and
 
concentrated in the area where Marx refutes Bauer. By using
 
the explicit performatives, Marx emphasizes the action of the
 
verb. Coupled with the third person singular pronoun, though
 
it could also be read as an implicit "I," he forces the
 
readers into an acceptance of his view. If readers are not
 
to offend the writer's "face", a breech of the Politeness
 
Principle, which will be addressed later, then they must
 
accede to Marx's claims.
 
It is in Marx's repetitive use of "we" plus the
 
performatives that a 1ink to rhetoric can be detected. If we
 
recall Kenneth Burke's definition of rhetoric aS both
 
persuasion and identification (see above, page 28), the use
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of "we" functions as a persuasive strategy to encourage the
 
readers to identify with the writer. By the same token, it
 
demonstrates to the readers that he, Marx, shares their view.
 
It should be remembered that performatives are not, in and of
 
themselves, factual. They produce a response. This response
 
is what rhetors, like Marx^ count on.
 
Any speech act, according to Austin, includes the
 
following:
 
(1) Locutionary Act - The act of saying. It includes
 
making linguistic sounds, arranging these sounds
 
according to grammar of a given language,
 
referring, and predicating.
 
(2) lllocutionary Act - The act of doing. By saying
 
"I promise..." one promises.
 
(3) Perlocutionary Act - The act that brings
 
consequences, i.e. effects the illocutionary act
 
has on the hearer. If I convince you and you are
 
convinced, then my utterance of convincing is said
 
to have a perlocutionary act.
 
Though the illocutionary force pf an utterance and its
 
perlocutionary effect may not coincide, as someone can be
 
warned against a particular course of action and may or may
 
not heed the warning, these three distinctions allow for the
 
study of the effect utterances have on the behaviour of
 
speaker and hearer ("Pragmatics," GEL 121).
 
Marx wants to ensure that the illocutionary force and
 
the perlocutionary effect coincide. From the example above
 
we extract:
 
We ask...(30)
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We do not claim... We claim...(31)
 
We do not turn ... we turn...(31)
 
We criticize...(31)
 
We express...,(31)
 
Marx hedges his bets. By using the performatives he
 
reinforces the perlocutionary effect; and by relying on
 
antimetabole, he further emphasizes his point by negation and
 
repetition.
 
J. R. Searle introduces a distinction between direct and
 
indirect speech acts, which depends on a recognition of the
 
intended perlocutionary effect of an utterance on a
 
particular occasion. (That is to say, the hearer infers from
 
the speaker not only what is said but also what is implied)^
 
Searle claims that we can discover the necessary and
 
sufficient conditions of each speech act. By using these
 
conditions, one can explain why a particular act is defective
 
and why a speech act is "indirect." An indirect speech act
 
applies or can apply to only one of the felicity conditions
 
while a direct speech act, applies to all the felicity
 
conditions for that speech act.
 
A subset of indirect speech acts are implicit
 
performatives. In "On the Jewish Question," the explicit
 
performatives found in the earlier portion of the essay are
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dropped in favor of implicit Ones. Marx asksj
 
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
 
need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the
 
Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.
 
("Question" 48)
 
The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the
 
nationality of the trader and above all of the
 
financier. ("Question" 51)
 
The social emancipation of the Jew is the
 
emancipation of society from Judaism.("Question"52)
 
Here, instead, he employs implicit performatives: "We
 
ask... in the questions, and "We assert," in the answers.
 
Marx is now confident of audience approval, and the
 
quotations above reflect this. They are written as indirect
 
speech acts adhering only to the second felicity condition-­
appropriateness to the persons and circumstances. He has
 
switched to a polemic form and there are distinct negative
 
associations to be inferred from the words "practical need,"
 
"self-interest," "huckstering," "money," "chimerical
 
nationality," "trader" and "financier."
 
But Speech Act Theory does not offer the discourse
 
analyst a way of determining how a particular set of
 
linguistic elements--such as those above—in a particular
 
context, comes to receive a particular interpreted meaning.
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Conversational Implicature
 
Conversational Implicature (CI) is an area of discourse
 
analysis that can best be expressed as "implications based on
 
our expectation of normal conversational conduct" (Keenan
 
256). It is culture/situation dependent in contrast to
 
standard logical implication. Logical implication holds that
 
certain utterances (given the agreed bn conventional meaning
 
of the logical words and the utterances truth) guarantee the
 
truth of others. Conversational "implicature depends on how
 
the utterer is expected to behave with respect to
 
conversational maxims, and these may vary situationally and
 
cross-culturally" (Keenan 256).
 
If there is an overlap between Conversational
 
Implicature and Speech Acts Theory (SA) it may be found in
 
Austin's Perlocutionary Act: the effect the illocutionary act
 
has on the hearer.
 
If we recall Austin's example of a Perlocutionary Act,
 
"If I try to convince you and you are convinced, the act of
 
convincing is said to have a perlocutionary act," what
 
happens in the case where the convincing is implicit? In the
 
enthymeme: "Gabriel is an angel, therefore Gabriel is
 
immortal" the missing premise, "All angels are immortal" is
 
implied. It is into this void, so to speak, that CI thrusts
 
itself, explaining the reader's or hearer's acceptance of
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what may not be apparent or even tangible* if we look again
 
at the syllogism we constructed for "On the Jewish Question":
 
Major Premise: All anti-social elements must be 
removed from society for it to succeed. 
Minor Premise 
(implied): [The Jew's, by nature, are set apart, 
anti-social.] 
Conclusion: Jews must be removed from society for
 
it to succeed.
 
we see that Marx has allowed CI to instill the minor premise
 
in the reader's mind. Whether readers accept or not the
 
validity of the argument is based upon their acceptance of
 
the implicit minor premise and this is based on
 
historical/social/psychological factors.
 
As with indirect speech acts, implicature can get people
 
to do something without asking them to do it specifically.
 
Whereas, the direct speech act takes a performative verb or
 
not, as the case might be:
 
I order you to sit down
 
Sit down!
 
the indirect:
 
Won't you please sit down?
 
offers both a literal and an implied meaning. Indirect
 
speech acts try to get someone to do something indirectly,
 
and both implicature and indirect speech acts try to explain
 
cases in which we don't say What we mean explicitly.
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H. P. Grice's Cooperative Principle states that
 
conversation is a cooperative venture governed by maxims of
 
truthfulness, relevance, informativeness, and manner, which
 
may be exploited for particular conversational effects.21
 
And, according to Grice, CI occurs when a speaker flouts a
 
maxim by blatantly failing to fulfill it. If the speaker is
 
able to fulfill the maxim and do so without violating another
 
maxim; is not opting out; and is not trying to mislead, yet
 
flouts or exploits a maxim, giving rise to a veritable
 
contradiction between what is stated and what is taken by the
 
hearer to be relevant to the conversation, conversational
 
implicature results.
 
According to Grice:
 
The presence of a conversational implicature must be
 
capable of being worked out; for even if it can in
 
fact be intuitively grssped/ unless the intuition is
 
replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if
 
present at all) will not count as coJ^versational
 
implicature; it will be conventional implicature^
 
(Grice 154)22
 
Thus when Marx writes:
 
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical heed,
 
self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew?
 
ifuckstering. What is his worldly god? Money,
 
("Question" 48)
 
he is flouting the maxim of manner. The italicized words
 
are, at face value, inndcuoUS^-with the posSibre exceptioh of
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huckstering. Yet contextualized by the preceding question,
 
"What is the profane basis of Judaism?" and the negative
 
connotations attached to the adjective "profane," the words
 
take on additional significance and become less than
 
perspicuous. This iack of clarity results in CI.
 
The rational approach, as in the case (or purportedly
 
so) with academic writing, is to be succinct, saying
 
precisely what you mean with the intent to argue or inform.
 
But this is not always interesting. For the most part, it
 
lacks implicature. Creative writing tends to use more. And
 
persuasive writing, such as political speech writing, and
 
advertising, is loaded with implicature.
 
Why do we use it?
 
As humans, we generally appreciate hard work; and
 
implicature involves the hearer to the extent that he or she
 
must work it out. This leads to camaraderie--as we must
 
share the enterprise and in doing so establish a
 
relationship. Implicature is unconventional and we like
 
unconventionality. And it appeals to our desires to be both
 
secretive and not give offense. We can use implicature to
 
get messages across without actually saying something
 
explicitly—especially in a negative case.
 
This is not to say that there are not problems inherent
 
in the use of implicature. Indeterminacy can result in
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listener/reader confusion.
 
Harvey: Do you want coffee?
 
Jeanette: Coffee keeps me awake.
 
Harvey may well ask, "Well does she want coffee or not?"
 
Jeanette's reply also might be construed by Harvey, in one
 
instance, as a way for Jeanette to distance herself from him.
 
Jeanette has flouted Grice's maxim of quantity; she has not
 
supplied sufficient information.
 
Suzanne: Where's John? I saw his bike on the lawn.
 
Again, what is Suzanne implying? The relevance of her
 
comment is questionable exploitation of the Cooperative
 
Principle's relation maxim). Without supplying a context,
 
Suzanne may frustrate the very relationship that she and the
 
hearer hope to consolidate.
 
Lack of context or relevance can also be an advantage.
 
A writer/speaker may choose to be ambiguous deliberately. If
 
an abusive husband is looking for his wife and asks her best
 
friend where she is and that friend replies:
 
There was a lot of rain downtown last night
 
the friend may be: (1) simply avoiding the question, (2)
 
implying that the husband (who works downtown) is all wet/a
 
real drip, or (3) giving the husband a hint that his wife
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went downtown the night before. The implicature can only
 
understood, or not, in light of the circumstances. The
 
friend's deliberate ambiguity in answering may allow her: (1)
 
to save face by not directly revealing a confidence, (2) to
 
not directly accuse the husband, or (3) indicate she is
 
opting out by offering a seeming non sequitur.
 
The personality of a writer/speaker may be determined
 
by his or her use of implicature or lack of it. If overused,
 
as with irony or metaphor, implicature can become tedious to
 
audiences. The user runs the risk of losing the audience's
 
respect or may be considered insincere. If used too little
 
or not at all, she may be boring. While there is always the
 
chance of being misunderstood, for the most part proper usage
 
will result in the speaker being considered a "good
 
communicator."
 
Another example of how the flouting of the felicity
 
conditions and Grice's cooperative maxims results in
 
conversational implicature Can be seen in a "figurative
 
utterance" from Marx's essay. Grice held that a figurative
 
utterance "implicates an open-ended disjunction of
 
propositions." Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber> in "On Grice's
 
Theory of Conversations," suggest instead that ''a figurative
 
utterance evokes a range of propositions, possibly
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interspersed with images" (163). Though running counter to
 
Grice, Wilson and Sperber's interpretation is most evident in
 
a passage in the second half of "On The Jewish Question."
 
Here Marx paraphrases Captain Hamilton as support for his
 
contention that the Jews/ through their acquisition of the
 
power of money, have corrupted Christians, instilling in them
 
a "practical spirit":
 
Thus, for example. Captain Hamilton reports that the
 
devout and politically free inhabitant of New England
 
is a kind of Laocpon who makes not the least effort to
 
escape from the serpents which are crushing him.
 
Mammon is his idol which he adores not only with his
 
lips but with the whole force of his body and
 
mind.(49)
 
The images Marx evokes are striking. We see the beleaguered
 
Trojan priest, Laocoon, as a stand-in for the New England
 
inhabitants (presumably Christian), beset by snakes—the Jews
 
and their greed. The snakes also bring to mind the Garden of
 
Eden and the serpents introduction of original sin. Mammon
 
can be interpreted as material wealth. Which invokes Matthew
 
6:24. "No man can serve two masters: for either he will
 
hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the
 
one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon."
 
Or "mammon" can understood as a reference to the demon
 
avarice one of the seven deadly sins. In either case, Marx
 
implies that this "idol" is worshipped not only in prayer but
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also in thought and deed.
 
Though Marx mixes metaphors, the effects of these
 
"figurative utterances" are to portray the pure Christian
 
populace as beset by the evils of Judaism yet unable or
 
incapable of resisting its tyranny, and this has caused them
 
to replace God with material wealth as an object of worship.
 
His point is clear. Judaism is a corrupting influence.
 
Politeness
 
In much the same way as conversational implicature,
 
politeness is dependent upon the culture and situation. Like
 
Austin's Felicity Conditions, which depend On both the form
 
of the words and that they be used under the right conditions
 
to successfully perform of a speech act, and Grice's maxims
 
for his Cooperative Principle, the rules of politeness are:
 
designed to get people through cooperative
 
transactions with a mihimal amount Of wasted effort,
 
or friction. Unlike the rules of conversation, they
 
are to some extent mutually exclusive: different ones
 
are applicable in different real-world situations, and
 
applying the wrong one at the wrong time may cause as
 
much friction as not applying any. (Lakoff 88)
 
Robin Lakoff, in "What You Can Do with Words:
 
Politeness, Pragmatics, and Performatives," states the rules
 
of politeness as follows:
 
(1) Formality: Don't impose/remain alopf
 
(2) Hesitancy: Allow the addressee his options
 
(3) Equality or camaraderie: Aot a® "though you and
 
the addressee were equal/make him feel good.
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In (1), the hearer is accorded respect through the use of a
 
title or last name or the use Of technical language.
 
Formality assumes distance and a certain amount of power;
 
breeching it can lead to an assumption of rudeness.
 
{2)Hesitancy, can be suggested by the use of euphemisms: "I'm
 
going to the bathroom" instead of, "I'm going to defecate;"
 
hedges, cogitives and tag questions—"You like this, don't
 
you?" "Would you pass the butter, please?" Hesitancy is used
 
to ascertain the distance or closeness of the exchange
 
between two parties. (3)Equality or camaraderie is used to
 
establish solidarity; it is used primarily among equals. If
 
someone uses camaraderie in a formal situation, it will give
 
offense and the converse is true as well.
 
Abiding by the rules is considered a standard, though
 
violations of Grice's maxims and the politeness rules occur
 
just as frequently and, as Lakoff is quick to point out,
 
those violations are not committed solely out of ignorance or
 
in an attempt to be rude, but can signal something else
 
implicit in the discourse.
 
Marx adheres to camaraderie in the first portion of the
 
essay, using the inclusive "we," as discussed earlier (pages
 
80-83), and by frequently quoting renowned sources such as
 
Gustave de Beaumont, Tocqueville, ihomas Hamilton and
 
Rousseau, he establishes solidarity with his well-read,
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literate audience. In the second section, Marx flagrantly
 
breaches formality: he is not averse to using language that
 
would normally be considered unacceptable in a formal paper:
 
it is from its own entrails that civil society
 
ceaselessly engenders the Jew. ("Question" 48)
 
or crudity to make his point:
 
The monotheism of the Jews is, therefore, in reality,
 
a polytheism of the numerous needs of man, a
 
polytheism which makes even the lavatory an object of
 
divine regulation. (48)
 
Marx moves from the sublime to the base. He uses Latin
 
phrases such as, helium omnium contra omnes (All-out war
 
against all) (35), in the first portion of the essay only to
 
slip into the most offensive, malediction later. Implicit in
 
this idiomatic maneuver is the author's sense of security
 
with his audience. Marx can comfortably make these claims
 
without regard to affronting readers.
 
Breaching hesitancy, Marx asks seemingly rhetorical
 
questions and then foists the answer on his reader.
 
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical need,
 
self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the Jew?
 
Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.
 
Very well: then in emancipating itself from
 
huckstering and mOney, and thus from real and
 
practical Judaism, our age would emancipate
 
itself.("Question" 48)
 
This should result in an assumption, by the audience, of bad
 
breeding and inexcusable vulgarity, but because he uses
 
camaraderie initially to establish a unity of interests with
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his readers and utilizes the Jew as the "other" in contrast
 
to that unity/ his violations are generally overlooked or
 
noted and accepted as part of his argument.
 
Why Marx chooses to observe thS politeness strategies in
 
the beginning of his essay only to ignore them later is an
 
intriguing question. Keeping in mind the audience for which
 
the essay was intended: the non-Jews of Europe and the
 
primarily German/ self-hating/ Jewish radicals of the 1840s/
 
it is possible to see that the camaraderie he fashions in the
 
first section with readers of his own ilk/ allows him to
 
flagrantly flaunt the rules of formality later on. What is
 
implicit in these violations of Lakoff's rules of politeness
 
is the unstated idea that writer and audience share the views
 
as stated.
 
In the same excerpt above/ we see the use of
 
interrogatives and declaratives:
 
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
 
need/ self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the
 
Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.
 
According to Lakoff/ a question seeks information and
 
requires a response and a declarative requires the
 
addressee's belief (101). However/ as Marx supplies the
 
answers to the questions he poses/ we can assume they are
 
asked in a rhetorical vein. Rhetorical questions/ when taken
 
as true questions by the addressee/ and not signaled/ are
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annoying. They violate Grice's quantity maxiin because they
 
are more than is needed (Lakoff 97). That Marx supplies the
 
answers as well can also be construed as a violation of
 
quantity. These violate Lakoff's second politeness rule,
 
hesitancy, allowing the addressee his options. Furthermore,
 
in Lakoffs hierarchy of indirect speech acts, the question
 
may implicate a declarative or an imperative, a
 
declarative may implicate an imperative or another
 
declarative, but an imperative may implicate only
 
another imperative, not a question or a declarative.
 
In this sense the imperative is the 'strongest' of the
 
three speech act types, a question the weakest. (100)
 
Marx couples his questions with his declaratives (as all
 
polemicists do) in the examples above. Lakoff points out
 
that by asking a question a "speaker acknowledges his
 
subservience, countering the amount of work the addressee is
 
expected to do" (101). Marx, however, supplies his own
 
answers. These declaratives require the readers to believe
 
what Marx is saying. This
 
is to ask less of [them] in terms of measurable
 
intellectual or physical labor, but it is asking
 
something more demeaning. To impart information that
 
is expected to be believed, the speaker puts himself
 
in a superior position to the addressee and is
 
presumably giving him something he needs.(101)
 
Is Marx intentionally insulting his readers? Not
 
necessarily. One of the means to persuade is to appear
 
authoritative. We saw ekriier that he used many
 
performatives early in the essay coupled with the inclusive
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 "we." And it was postulated that the readers, not wanting to
 
offend, would believe Marx's declaratives. Lakoff suggests
 
that performatives, while violating the rule of quantity^
 
lend clarity. However, they still violate the rules of
 
politeness by closing off the addressee's options, telling
 
him
 
how he is to think, what he is to do, and how he is to
 
reply. By implication, then, he is being ordered
 
around peremptorily, and not being treated as an equal
 
(violation of Rule 3) and being pressured as well
 
(violation of Rule 1).(103)
 
There is also a rhetorical component to his voice; he is
 
using a form of catachresis, by which:
 
a writer seems to have come close to abusing the
 
legitimate function of substitution. He has made a
 
substitution of a word which, far from having an
 
easily definable connection with the substitutee,
 
seems to have been chosen precisely because of its
 
inappropriateness.(Quinn 55)
 
By equating "practical need, self interest" with Judaism,
 
using "huckstering" to define the Jew, and identifying
 
"money" as the Jew's god, Marx slips into the colloquial of
 
the street. He deliberately flaunts the conventions for, as
 
rhetoricians might say, stylistic purposes—to catch the
 
reader's eye.
 
Marx remains puzzling though. He uses "we" to preface
 
his performatives, which the addressee does not perceive in
 
the same way as the first persbn singular pronoun "I." "We"
 
subscribes to Rule 3, building equality and camaraderie.
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 This in some way mitigates the previous politeness
 
transgressions. Nevertheless, Marx seems to alternate
 
between the inveigler and the bully. Part of the bullying is
 
found in what can be termed rudeness.
 
In "Linguistic Politeness" Gabriele Kasper discusses
 
three forms of rudeness: 1) that due to lack of affect
 
control, 2) strategic rudeness, and 3) ironic rudeness.
 
Strategic rudeness, which is Marx's leitmotif, Kasper defines
 
as "purposefully utilized by an actor in order to achieve a
 
certain goal" (210). He suggests that, as Lakoff
 
demonstrated in her analysis of American Courtroom discourse:
 
the prosecutor is licensed to attack the defendant in
 
a manner incompatible with the principles of politic
 
conduct in ordinary conversation...[he] is endowed
 
with the right to mobilize resources that would be
 
illicit in Other types of interaction, in particular
 
rude attacks serving to break down the defendant's
 
control. In addition to exerting psychological
 
pressure, transgressing rules of politic conduct in
 
the interaction with the defendant symbolically marks
 
this person as having forfeited claims to public
 
protection. The symbolic withdrawal of social rights
 
does not only serve to adversely affect the
 
defendant's self-esteem but at least as much the
 
jury's assessment of the defendant's qualities as a
 
social member. In this sense, the defendant is
 
treated as guilty before the jury has decided on their
 
verdict. (Kasper 210)
 
Kasper goes on to state that this "licensed enactment of
 
rudeness" reverses the sequencing rules of ordinary
 
conversation whereby "rudeness as display of aggressive
 
affect is legitimate only as reactive behaviour" (210) in
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response to another's preceding act of rudeness. He holds
 
that strategic rudeness "is initiating and does not license
 
its addressee to retaliate" (210). I argue that this is not
 
accurate. The prosecutor, by already assuming the guilt of
 
the defendant, attempts to force the jury to view the
 
defendant as having already initiated the rudeness by virtue
 
of his having committed a crime; therefore his (the
 
prosecutor's) rudeness is merely retaliatory effect control.
 
Marx apparently uses the same strategy in his
 
presentation of the "case" to the "jury" (the readers). He
 
presumes the defendant (the Jew) is already guilty, therefore
 
he must only convince the jury.
 
Marx's rudeness, his use of stereotypes, do "transgress
 
the rules of politic conduct"; they "mark the person as
 
having forfeited claims to public protection" and "adversely
 
affect the defendant's self-esteem" as well as "the
 
[reader's] assessment of the [Jews'] qualities as a social
 
member."
 
Nonetheless, they are, in the same sense as courtroom
 
drama, effective.
 
As we have seen, Marx vacillates between politeness, as
 
defined by Lakoff, and rudeness. Based On the evidence of
 
his formally classical education and his writing, which
 
generally adheres to standard logical implications (pages 85­
99
 
87)/ we cahnbt assume that these transgressions are
 
inadvertent or the mistakes of a novice. As a consummate
 
rhetorician, Marx alternates between formality and
 
camaraderie, only to disregard formality to indulge in foul
 
invective. But rather than disenfranchising his readers,
 
this strategy keeps them intrigued. His rudeness (going back
 
to our argument with Kasper) is retaliatory, motivating the
 
readers, by the rules of ordinary conversation, to view the
 
Jew as the rudeness initiator. The readers, by Marx's clever
 
use of"we," are transformed into something other than simply
 
a passive audience. They identify with Marx; he and they are
 
the "we." The Jew, having Ostensibly initiated the
 
argument/fight, is now liable for the audience's revenge. It
 
can be argued that Marx, by virtue of writing the essay, has
 
retaliated. But the readers have not had their opportunity
 
to do so. Marx exploits this sense of unfinished business.
 
Implicit in his incendiary remarks is the point that the jews
 
started all this. Now we have the opportunity to not only
 
retaliate but change things permanently.
 
Marx's employs the explicit coupled with the implicit.
 
This methodology in some way reflects his anti-Semitism at
 
times overt, at others covert* Like a man on unproven ice,
 
he treads heavily when he's sure the support is there. But
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when uncertain, he steps gingerly, attempting to maintain one
 
foot on solid ground.
 
Presupposition
 
In her essay, "Presupposition" in Pragmatics and
 
Natural Lanauaae Understanding, Georgia Green defines
 
presupposition as a term which refers to "propositions whose
 
truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a linguistic
 
expression, propositidhs without which the utterance cannot
 
be evaluated" (71).
 
Geoffrey and Ross WinterOwd concur; presupposition is
 
knowledge taken as given. Like implicature, it is a form of
 
"gap" in the semantics of textual coherence. Knowledge
 
derived from the text, though hot directly stated, is
 
inference. Their example is:
 
The twenty-five-year-old-man will marry the
 
octogenarian millionairess.
 
Part of understanding the sentence involves the
 
presupposition that the man and woman are single and have
 
consented to marricige, Alsd/ one inference is that the man
 
is marrying the woman for her money. However, based on this
 
inference another is possible: that the speaker/writer of
 
the sentence has passed an unfavorable moral judgement on the
 
young man (Winterowd 2). One might also infer that the woman
 
bribed him to do it, in which case it could be further
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inferred that she is desperate.
 
Marx uses presupposition knowing that his audience is
 
well aware of and, in many instances, shares his
 
stereotypical vision of the Judaism/Jews. That Jews are
 
presupposed to be beneath contempt, allows him to state with
 
little risk;
 
What is the profane basis of Judaism? Practical
 
need, self-interest. What is the worldly cult of the
 
Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly god? Money.
 
("Question" 48)
 
The italicized words may be understood simply by their
 
denotations. But once again, as with many other words Marx
 
uses that we have examined, the italics signal something more
 
to the reader--the words' connotations, their inferences.
 
In this case, as in past examples (page 60), they are
 
negative inferences, emblematic of something despicable.
 
Anyone who possesses these characteristics is to be reviled.
 
J. L. Morgan, in "Two Types of Convention in Indirect
 
Speech Acts," identifies three properties of presupposition:
 
(1) Presupposition is semantic material which is taken for
 
granted, entailed or assumed and not asserted, questioned or
 
ordered in the sentence. It is undeniable; once presupposed,
 
you cannot deny it:
 
People wept in the streets when JFK was shot.
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Denying the presupposition-^-JFK was shot—would not be
 
successful:
 
But JFK was not shot.
 
(2) Nonnegatability shows that the presupposition associated
 
with a word or construction are constant when the clause
 
containing the word or construction is negated or questioned ^
 
That is, negating the main verb does not negate the
 
presupposition:
 
People did not weep in the street when JFK was shot.
 
(3) Presuppositions cannot be denied without evident self-

contradiction (as in property 1), but they can be suspended:
 
My students would be lazy, if I had students.
 
Presuppositions are relative to an "assumed" world.
 
While it is generally taken for granted that the relevant
 
world is the real world (as presumed to be mutually known)
 
there are certain "world creating" verbs and constructipns
 
that can define other worlds as relevant for the evaluation
 
of presupposition-involving constructions (Green 76).
 
If graduate school was a drug, we'd have all O.D.'d b
 
now.
 
Suppose mail boxes could be bought; I'd buy one and
 
charge people money to put their letters in it.
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I dreamed that all men were tolerant of each other and
 
we had achieved world peace.
 
If, suppose and dream do not establish a new world
 
for the presuppositions all by themselves; it takes a world-

creating word and its complement to establish the world
 
defined by the propositibnal content of the complement.
 
The world-defining proposition does not have to be
 
identical to the presupposition it warrants. It is
 
sufficient if the worrd-defining proposition provides a
 
necessary or sufficient condition for the presupposed
 
proposition.
 
Green, too, argues that presupposition cannot be solely
 
explained as a semantic phenomenon. She sees it (as does
 
Morgan), not as "a semantic property inherent in lexical
 
items, but a pragmatic property of utterances in context"
 
(77).
 
While it is tempting to assume that presupposition is
 
something that is taken for granted the questions arise:
 
granted by whom? and taken for granted by whom? Some have
 
said that it requires that it be mutual knowledge; both
 
speaker and addressee must assume it is true, and that the
 
speaker assumes that the addressee assumes it. Green points
 
out that this is erroneous. A sentence like:
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Sorry I'm late—my children spilled milk on me, and I
 
had to take the time to change my clothes.
 
does not require that the addressee take the presupposed
 
proposition fbr granted (that the speaker has children) to
 
consider a sentence with a presupposition to be evaluatable
 
as true or false. The addressee only has to be willing to
 
infer that the speaker does, and that the speaker expects
 
that he, the addressee, can reasonably infer that the speaker
 
does (Green 81).
 
The fact that an addressee would take a presupposition
 
for granted and not evaluate it as true or false is the
 
loophole that evangelists, politicians, advertisers, lawyers
 
and any other form of propagandists can best exploit.
 
Lawyer: Have you stopped beating your wife?
 
Defendant: I don't beat my wife!
 
Lawyer: Answer the question! Yes or no?
 
If the defendant answers in the affirmative, he admits to
 
having beaten his wife. If he says no, he implies that he is
 
still beating her. In either case it is presupposed that he
 
has or still is beating his wife.
 
Generally, we do not challenge presuppositions. Ann
 
Weiser, in "Deliberate Ambiguity," proposes an addendum to
 
Grice's Cooperative Principle--"maintain smooth flow" (726).
 
If this appended maxim holds, then both in the interest of
 
saving face and not interrupting the flow by challenging an
 
105
 
assumption, a speaker may introduce new information or an
 
opinion as a presupposition.
 
If you imagine that a person using a sentence
 
containing presupposed and non-presupposed material is
 
in effect saying, "Assume that part and respond to
 
this part," then it becomes clear that you are not
 
cooperating if you respond instead to the
 
presupposition. (Weiser 727)
 
Weiser supplies the following example:
 
X: 	Nixon's dishonesty is a threat to our personal
 
freedom.
 
Y^: Yes, I feel threatened by it, too.
 
Y^: Do you think it is? I'm not too worried.
 
Y^t Wait—you're assuming he's dishonest. I don't
 
agree. (727)
 
The third reply, Y3, is the one that would break the flow by
 
challenging the presupposition—that Nixon is dishonest. In
 
both Y1 and Y2 the presupposition is accepted; only the
 
threat to personal freedom is conceded or disputed/
 
respectively.
 
In the following quotation from "On the Jewish Question"
 
In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews
 
is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism.
 
("Question" 49)
 
Marx cleverly introduces the presupposition that Jews need
 
emancipation. That Marx's readers are willing to infer that
 
he takes the stereotypiGal view of the Jews for granted, and
 
Marx, himself, expects his readers to infer this allows him
 
to proffer it without a world-creating Word and its
 
complement. By presenting the information as a
 
presupposition, Marx does not need to argue this point.
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If we assess the statement using J. L. Morgan's three
 
properties of presupposition we see:
 
(1) But Jews don't need emancipation.
 
Denying the presupposition is not successful.
 
(2) The emancipation of the Jews is not the
 
emancipation of mankind from Judaism.
 
Negating the main verb does not negate the presupposition.
 
(3) The emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation
 
of mankind from Judaism. But Jews don't need
 
emancipation.
 
This is a self-contradictory statement unless we use a world-

creating word and its complement:
 
The emancipation of the Jews would be the emancipation
 
of mankind from Judaism, if Jews needed emancipation.
 
In the final analysis it is clear that Marx's ability to
 
use presupposition makes readers accept this statement, and
 
the numerous variations on the same theme throughout the
 
essay# without challenge.
 
Mutual Knowledge
 
A large part of presupposition is mutual knowledge.
 
Gordon P. Thomas defines "mutual knowledge" as "the
 
knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs that a speaker or writer
 
and the audience knowingly have in common" (582). He
 
contrasts this to "shared knowledge" which is "the
 
information and beliefs that are shared but may not be
 
believed to be shared" (582). He points out that:
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The distihGtion is important, for the fact that I know
 
that you know something (a state of Mutual Knowledge)
 
enables me to exploit that "something" in very complex
 
ways. That complexity grows in part from the fact
 
that I know you will know that I can exploit it. The
 
implications of knowledge merely shared (but not known
 
to be shared) do not resonate in this fashion. If I
 
do not know you know some fact, I cannot use that
 
knowledge in the same way I could if I were certain
 
that you knew it. (Thomas 582)
 
The use of the Jew as a scapegoat for societal ills is a
 
form of mutual knowledge. Exploitation of this mutual
 
knowledge allows Marx to make his case in "On the Jewish
 
Question" with need for little mOre than a reiteration of
 
these notions.
 
Thomas breaks down mutual knowledge into three parts:
 
1) Knowledge of Conventions—the shared understandings of
 
regularities of punctuation, spelling, words, grammar,
 
idioms, genres of writing (in any given language community)
 
on the part of writers and their audiences; 2) Knowledge Of
 
Language—-the audience's recognition of the writer's
 
intentions when a condition of relevant mutual knowledge
 
holds, which involves a) the audience's recognition of the
 
writer's intentions and b) the writer's expectation of that
 
recognition (a second-level expectation); and 3) World
 
Knowledge-- "before a writer even produces one word, her
 
audience already knows a good deal about what she might say.
 
An author uses her knowledge of what she believes that
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audience knows in order to say something 'new'" (Thomas 586­
87).
 
A skilled writer will have a fairly accurate idea of
 
what she can expect her audience to know about the
 
world—facts, common opinions, and so forth. Included
 
in the "World Knowledge" is a good understanding of
 
what her audience already knows and believes about the
 
world. A skilled writer will have as her primary task
 
the goal of getting her audience to believe or feel
 
closer to the way the writer does about a certain
 
aspect of the world: the traditional expression of
 
this feeling or belief is the familiar "thesis
 
statement," but we alSo know that in much writing such
 
a feeling is often implicit. (Thomas 587)
 
Marx, relying on 	the mutual knowledge he shares with the
 
audience, that of the Jew as the scapegoat, and his
 
audiences' World 	Knowledge, that society could always be
 
changed for the better, allows him to persuade his audience
 
of the validity of his argument:
 
Major Premise: 	 All anti-social elements must be
 
removed from society for it to succeed.
 
Minor Premise
 
(implied): [The Jew's, by nature, are set apart,
 
anti-social.]
 
Conclusion: 	 Jews must be removed from society for
 
it to succeed.
 
The key to Marx's, or any other writer's use of World
 
knowledge is Grice's Cooperative Principle. As was discussed
 
before:
 
in situations of informative communication both
 
speakers and hearers act with reference to one
 
overriding assumption: that the speaker attempts in
 
all utterances to be cooperative. (Thomas 587)
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To get to the reason why Marx chooses to imply genocide
 
rather than overtly state it we can can begin by looking at a
 
similar question that Rong Ghen asks of Grice's theory of
 
conversational implicature and its resolution. In
 
"Conversational Implicature and Poetic Metaphor," Chen
 
states:
 
Although Grice successfully accounts for how
 
conversational implicature come about through the
 
violation of the maxims, he does not explain, at least
 
explicitly, why the hearer prefers to violate a
 
particular maxim rather than to say what he means
 
directly. (61)
 
Chen proposes three motivations for the violation of
 
conversational maxims: the Politeness Principle, whereby one
 
conveys negative opinions by the use of conversational
 
implicature for fear of appearing impolite; the Self-

interest Principle, which motivates a speaker to be cautious
 
in what she says or how she says it to avoid undesirable
 
consequences to herself; and the Expressiveness Principle,
 
which a speaker uses because she wants to be expressive.
 
Expressiveness is comprised of two aspects, according to
 
Chen:
 
First, it indicates that the speaker has strong
 
emotions about what she is conveying. Second, the
 
speaker wants to pass on her emotion and meaning to
 
the hearer forcefully and effectively, leaving as much
 
impact, psychological, aesthetic, or otherwise, as
 
possible on the hearer. As a result, the speaker uses
 
language elaborate in structure and deviant from the
 
norm, which might sacrifice clarity and easy
 
understanding as specified by Grice's Cooperative
 
Principle. (62-63)
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Marx is alternately polite, using conversational
 
implicature to convey negative opinions; Self-interested,
 
demonstrating cautiousness in building a strong but slow
 
argument so as not to immediately alienate his audience; and
 
expressive (per Chen's definition), using deliberately
 
elaborate, sometimes opaque, language to pass on his
 
passionate agenda. It is his use of clarity: active voice
 
and declaratives, coupled with his retreats to ambiguity:
 
passive voice and implicit premises that seduce and provoke
 
the readers, leaving them with, as Chen suggests, the
 
psychological and aesthetic (or in this case unaesthetic)
 
impact of an inferred Jewish genocide.
 
Deliberate Ambiguity
 
At this juncture, it is worthwhile reviewing some of the
 
aspects of conversational implicature as they relate to
 
ambiguity in general and "On the Jewish Question,"
 
specifically.
 
Implicature is linked to politeness, according to Robin
 
Lakoff, when the speaker/writer is fearful of having to pay
 
the consequences fqt something he says hpi itiay resort to
 
circumlocution.
 
Conversational implicature is a special case of
 
Politeness Rule 2 [Hesitancy: Allow the addressee his
 
options]; at least conventionally it qives the
 
addressee leeway in interpreting what is said to him.
 
Ill
 
He need not automatically realize that he has just
 
been told THAT, whatever undesirable thing THAT may
 
be.(100)
 
If we recall Marx's audience, his ambiguity and implicature
 
may be more understandable. Marx's target audience is made
 
up of non-Jews, or at the least, self-hating ones. But among
 
his readers there may be those Jews who are not yet fully
 
convinced of his argument. So he is careful; he cannot risk
 
disenfranchising them at this juncture.
 
Politeness iS often defined by its violation of Grice'S
 
principle of clarity, "Be clear, unless there is some reason
 
not to be" in addition to the maxims of quality, quantity,
 
relation, manner.
 
Then, if clarity is not achieved, the participants in
 
the conversation will, by this metarule and their
 
concept of implicature, both be able to figure put why
 
the contribution was unclear, and what its translation
 
is. (Lakoff 99)
 
Lakoff states that there are "various overriding reasons
 
[for violations of clarity] that we can identify."
 
First, literature is notorious for lack of clarity, 
poetry in particular, and often it seems that the more 
highly regarded the work, the harder the reader has to 
mediate between the printed word and its intention. 
The result is that each reader, since he has to some 
extent an individual gfammar by which he interprets 
implicatures,'feceives his own messagie; a ■ work of art 
is not the same v^pfk;to all people. It is this : 
process of mediation that makes reading good works of 
literature an exciting intellectual exercise, and also 
one of the things that distinguishes "creative" 
writing from scientific, technical, or academic prose, 
which attempts above all to be clear and unambiguous 
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—and thereby sacrifices, perhaps necessarily, any
 
esthetic pleasure it might possibly impart to its
 
readers. (Lakoff 99)
 
Her description of "scientific, technical or academic prose,"
 
troubles me though, because some "non-creative" writers write
 
ambiguously, sometimes deliberately. Marx is intentionally
 
ambiguous at times and quotes out of context purposely to
 
deceive and serve his own agenda.
 
In concluding his argument in part one of his essay,
 
Marx excerpts from J. J. Rousseau's "The Legislator," Book
 
II, Chapter VII of The Social Contract;
 
Whoever dares undertake to establish a people's
 
institutions must feel himself capable of changing,
 
as it were, human nature itself, of transforming
 
each individual who, in isolation, is a complete but
 
solitary whole, into a part of something greater than
 
himself, from which in a sense, he derives his life
 
and his being; [of changing man's nature in order to
 
strengthen it;] of substituting a limited and moral
 
existence for the physical and independent life [with
 
which all of us are endowed by nature]. His task, in
 
short, is to take from a man his own powers, and to
 
give him in exchange alien powers which he can only
 
employ with the help of other men. (qtd. in "Question"
 
46)
 
Marx is quite careful to set off the quotation, using
 
quotation marks (something he is not always so scrupulous
 
about in his quotations from Bauer). The emphases are not
 
Rousseau's and the bracketed portions were deleted in Marx's
 
work. With the bracketed portions intact, it is clear that
 
Rousseau believed there was "a human nature." Marx did not
 
share this opinion. He held that there was only human
 
113
 
history; hence, no permanent conditions confront human
 
beings—there is no permanent human nature.
 
However, also in "On the Jewish Question," Marx refers
 
continuously to the Jewish nature. He says that Bauer asks
 
"the Jews to break with the essence of the Christian
 
religion, but this demand does not follow, as [Bauer] himself
 
admits, from the development of the Jewish nature"
 
("Question" 47). Marx continues:
 
Bauer regards the ideal and abstract essence of the
 
Jew—his religion'—as the whole of his nature. He
 
therefore, concludes rightly that 'The Jew contributes
 
nothing to mankind when he disregards his own limited
 
law,' when he renounces all his Judaism." ("Question"
 
47)
 
The implication is that the Jew's nature is his religion and
 
his religion is his nature. The two are inseparable. And
 
there is nothing worthwhile to be found in Jews devoid of
 
Judaism. From this apparently valid, although circularly
 
reasoned, argument, Marx proceeds to attack the "Jewish
 
nature" and its impact upon society. In doing so, Marx
 
argues against his own argument regarding human nature—not
 
the hallmark of a skilled rhetor. So why does he do so? He
 
is signaling something else—an implicit strategy.
 
We cannot considered Marx a racist as the biology of
 
race was not considered until several decades after Marx
 
wrote "On the Jewish Question" (see above, pages 7-8). And it
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is an bversittiplifiGatibn, based on Marx's own history and
 
psychology/ to excuse Marx's discourse as an attempt to use
 
Judaism as a sign for all that is vile in capitalism. For
 
his argument regarding Jews to make any sense, the implicit
 
premise is that the "Jewish nature" must be the exception to
 
mankind's lack of a human nature. Marx's focus is on "Jewish
 
nature." The word "nature" is used instead of biology or
 
religion with the result being an equivocation--a hedge,
 
based upon inference and ambiguous language.
 
In Marx's declarative statements:
 
In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is
 
the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. ("Question"
 
49)
 
The social emancipation of the Jew is the
 
emancipation of society from Judaism.{"Question" 52)
 
a presupposition is forced on the readers, as was previously
 
demonstrated (pages 106-07), and by doing so it also fosters
 
belief. However, Marx's meaning of "emancipation," as was
 
discussed earlier in the chapter on rhetoric (page 50), is
 
euphemistic and unclear. Emancipation can mean freedom,
 
salvation, liberation, deliverance, riddance or eradication.
 
The latter two definitions carry more negative associations,
 
though depending upon whether one uses the preposition "of"
 
or "from" in conjunction with the term, the same could be
 
said of the former four. Keeping in mind the fact that Marx
 
has never missed an opportunity to supply or play upon the
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negative connotations of words, it is difficult to imagine he
 
has changed modus operandi here.
 
Nevertheless, offering Marx the benefit of the doubt, he
 
is still hedging. As Lakoff points out:
 
Euphemism, then, seeks to give the addressee a way out
 
of having to face the facts as facts. It gives him (at
 
least conventionally, again) a different way of
 
looking at a potentially unviewable notion. (90)
 
Consequently, clarity is not served.
 
Looking back to Lakoff's earlier claim where she states,
 
if either the politeness rules or Grice's are violated
 
something else must be going on, we cannot help but perceive
 
that Marx's implicature, his avoidance of clarity, his
 
euphemisms, his ambiguity—-demand closer scrutiny.
 
We have seen that when speakers/writers flout the
 
respective maxims, principles, or rules, the result is
 
conversational implicature/rudeness. It has been
 
demonstrated that Marx's writing is, at times, ambiguous.
 
The questions rema,in. Why? What purpose is served?
 
In her essay "Deliberate Ambiguity," Ann Weiser
 
addresses how"a speaker might utter h sentence with two acts
 
in mind, willing that either one of them be taken as his or
 
her intent in uttering the sentence, willing that either of
 
two different acts of presuppositions and felicity conditions
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 be taken as operative" (723-24). She calls this "deliberate
 
ambiguity and says that it
 
is used in situations where the speaker is Uncertain
 
as to which of two states of affairs holds for the
 
addressee, does not want to speak so as to presume one
 
or the other true, but does want the situation to
 
'carry forward;'23 therefore, he/she uses a sentence
 
that would fit either of the possible states of the
 
addressee and would 'carry forward' the situation in
 
either case. (724)
 
She says that the difference between the presupposition
 
strategy and that used in deliberate ambiguity rests on the
 
speaker's intent. Though both rely on maintaining smooth
 
flow, presupposition is used to "sneak in" new information,
 
while steering the conversation away from that particular
 
point. Deliberate ambiguity, by contrast, steers the
 
conversation toward that new information (728). For example;
 
Two school friends, Ryan and Dave are talking about a mutual
 
friend, Susan. Ryan is interested in taking Susan to a
 
dance, but knows that she and Dave have had an oh-again/off­
again relationship. He doesn't want to risk offending Ryan
 
in the event that (a) they are either still dating or (bj she
 
dumped him. He does however want to know if she is
 
available. Ryan says, ''Susan's sure popular. Do you think
 
she's going to the dance?" if Dave answers that she's going
 
with him or someone else, Ryan has not offended hin* and he's
 
found out the new information he sought. If Dave answers he
 
doesn't care or doesn't know, Ryan then can decide whether or
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not to ask her out, and he has still gained new knowledge
 
without annoying Dave.
 
In our examples from Marx:
 
In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is
 
the emancipation of mankind from Judaism. ("Question"
 
Ihe social emancipation of the Jew is the
 
emancipation of society from Judaism.{"Question" 52)
 
we can see in both quotations, he steers the reader toward
 
the new information by use of the end-focus principle and the
 
preceding presuppositions.
 
Weiser assures us that though these strategies sound
 
calculating and devious (and may be so) they are not
 
necessarily perpetrated with complete conscious awareness
 
(728). This lack of full conscious awareness fits in with
 
our profile of Marx's Jewish self-hatred, also a less than
 
completely conscious act.
 
Weiser goes on to stipulate that deliberate ambiguity
 
cannot be defined by either form or situation alone as it
 
deals with the use of "certain types of sentences in certain
 
situations" (724). The use of deliberate ambiguity is most
 
likely to occur in
 
'socially tricky' situations...those in which the
 
speaker has something to lose if he/she acts on the
 
assumption that a certain state of affairs is true and
 
it turns out not to be, but something to gain if that
 
certain state of affairs is actually true. (724)
 
It is hard to imagine a more potentially "socially tricky"
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situation than advancing the idea of Jewish genocide to a
 
largely Jewish audience proffered by, of all people, a Jew.
 
There still exist disturbing facts that demand
 
explanation. Marx strategically avoids clarity; With respect
 
to Jews/Judaism, he relies heavily on the negative
 
connotations of words instead of the positive ones, or their
 
denotations; he foists presuppositions onto the reader; there
 
are equivocations in his euphemistic use of "emancipation,"
 
(which Lakoff suggests is a way of viewing the unviewable) in
 
conjunction with his dubious use of the prepositions "of" and
 
"from"; his audience and the social situation he finds
 
himself in require the utmost delicacy of word and deed.
 
All this predisposes us to conclude that Marx is being
 
not just ambiguous hut intentionally ambiguous.
 
Weiser says that "speakers can produce sentences with
 
two meanings in mind; intending that only one will be
 
conveyed but not knowing which one it will be" (729). In
 
light of this statement and by applying her definition of
 
deliberate ambiguity,
 
[it] is used in situations where the speaker is
 
uncertain as to which of two states of affairs holds
 
for the addressee, does not want to speak so as to
 
presume one or the other true, but does want the
 
situation to 'carry forward;' therefore, he/she uses a
 
sentence that Would fit either of the possible states
 
of the addressee and would 'carry forward' the
 
situation in either case, (724)
 
we cannot discount a second option to the popularly held
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opinion that Marx was using Judaism as a surrogate for all
 
that he found repugnant in Capitalism, Marx's use of
 
deliberate ambiguity cloaks another more sinister agenda-­
In the final analysis, the eradication of the Jews is
 
the deliverance of mankind from Judaism.
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CHAPTER FOUR
 
CONCLUSION
 
[I]n certain situations, reason exercises
 
little or no persuasive force when vying
 
against the combined powers of rage,
 
fear/ and prejudice, which together forge
 
innumerable hateful ways of knowing the
 
world that have their own internalized
 
systems, self-sustaining logics, and
 
justifications.
 
Richard E. Miller
 
Two contemporaries of Marx, Ludwig Borne and Heinrich
 
Heine, both converts to Christianity, reviled the Jews only
 
to retreat from their positions later. Heine blamed
 
Christianity for leading him into "faithlessness, disloyalty
 
and hypocrisy," while Borne claimed he had become baptized so
 
that:
 
he could abuse Germans, as a German, for their
 
medievalism, lack of liberty and vicious treatment Of
 
the Jews until he had created the society in which
 
there were neither Jews nor Christians, but only free
 
men. (Kamenka,"Baptism" 344)
 
Even Engels was to recant seven years after Marx's death
 
proclaiming, "Anti-Semitism is the characteristic sign of a
 
backward civilization..." (qtd. in Kamenka, "Baptism" 348).
 
Marx never retreated from his position.
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Like his essay, Karl Marx was composed of many parts.
 
His anti-Semitism cannot be condoned but given the
 
circumstances of his birth and the world he found himself in,
 
neither should he be condemned for it. If one can find
 
something laudatory in his behavior perhaps it is his
 
intractability.
 
Sartre tells us in his essay "The Passion of the Anti-

Semite" that the anti-Semite does not deny that the Jew is
 
hardworking and intelligent. He will readily admit that he
 
is inferior in these regards to the Jew. The anti-Semite
 
does this to demonstrate that the more virtues the Jew
 
possesses the more dangerous he can be. The anti-Semite
 
considers himself average, mediocre and takes pleasure in
 
this; "he is the man of the crowd" (149). He cannot be an
 
anti-Semite alone:
 
...a man is not necessarily humble or even modest
 
because he has consented to mediocrity. On the
 
contrary, there is a passionate pride among the
 
mediocre, and anti-Semitism is an attempt to give
 
value to mediocrity as such, to create an elite of the
 
ordinary. (149)
 
Marx strives "to create an elite of the ordinary" in his
 
writing, specifically in "On the Jewish Question." It is
 
through his use of rhetorical persuasiveness, style and its
 
implicature that it is made manifest. After all, isn't the
 
"common man" at the core of Marxism--the rise of the
 
proletariat?
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Today, 150 years later, Louise Harnby, writing about the
 
passage of California's Proppsition 187 and its denial of
 
social services to "illegal aliens," makes the point that
 
Californians who voted for the proposition:
 
should feel proud to be in excellent historical
 
company. Some 60 years ago. Hitler and his Nazis also
 
came to power in 'democratic' elections and enacted
 
similar restrictions to another 'alien' group: The
 
Jews. And in U.S. history there are many other, more
 
or less gruesome, precedents, such as the segregation
 
of African Americans, putting Japanese Americans in
 
concentration camps during the war, or the earlier
 
laws against Chinese Americans and other immigrants
 
who were seen as an economic or cultural threat to the
 
dominating Euro-majority. ("On Propositions, Racism
 
and Democracy")
 
She goes on to say that human rights abuses are now being
 
cloaked in respectability by these propositions, these
 
official policies and "formulated in terms of arguments,
 
rhetoric and definitions of the social and political
 
situation, typically blam[e] the victims for all social
 
evili"
 
The point in combining the historical, philosophical,
 
psychological, rhetorical and linguistic disciplines in this
 
study, besides their obvious overlaps and interrelatedness,
 
was to suggest different approaches to analyzing and
 
assessing not only Marx's essay but other works, such as
 
those precedent-setting ones Hornby alludes to, as well.
 
There is a symbiosis among language, history, philosophy
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and psychology. Linguistics and its extensions, discourse
 
analysis, stylistics and pragmatics, reflect these
 
associations. It may be that one field is sufficient to
 
extract meaning from a text; we may find that rhetorical
 
analysis or stylistics is sufficient for our purposes. But
 
when, as is sometimes the case, there are limitations to the
 
discipline, or the critic, or the text is dense and the
 
underlying meaning still suspect, it may be advisable to
 
consult another discipline either for corroboration or for
 
new insight. I found this to be the case when I was
 
confounded by my inability to prove Marx's apparent demand
 
for Jewish eradication in his essay solely through the use of
 
stylistics and rhetorical analysis. Finally, after having
 
woven the rhetorical, historical, and psychological
 
investigations together, I ventured to examine the product
 
through the lens of pragmatics, in order to reveal the
 
inherent presupposition, implicature and inference that
 
called for genocide.
 
If there is something more to be gained from the insight
 
obtained in using the tools of analysis demonstrated in this
 
study^ it is the avoidance of giving value to the mediocrity
 
that Sartre cautions against and, as Harnby suggests, the
 
ability to astutely interpret political commentary so that we
 
do not irresponsibly foment social evil and human rights
 
abuses.
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 GLOSSARY
 
Ad hominum: Arguing against a claim by attacking the holder
 
in irrelevant ways.
 
Ad ignorantiam: Whereby someone fallaciously argues that
 
because we don't know if a certain statement is true
 
then it is false or because we have no proof that it is
 
false, then it is true.
 
Anaphora: Repetition of beginhings (Rhetorical Figures). an
 
endophoric relationship whereby the meaning of
 
expressions is recovered from previous mention
 
(Stylistics).
 
Antimetabole: An inverse repetition at the level of words
 
coupled with a negation.
 
Antithesis: Repetition by negation.
 
Asyndeton: The omission of an expected conjunction.
 
Catachresis: "Apparently inappropriate substitution of one
 
word for another, inappropriate because there is not an
 
obviously definable relationship between the two" (Quinn
 
102).
 
Cataphoric: An endophoric relationship whereby the meaning
 
of expressions is recovered from subsequent mention.
 
Chronological sequencing: "textual time imitates real time:
 
that if A comes before B in the model of reality, then A
 
comes before B in the text" (Leech and Short 234).
 
Climax: The principle of climax dictates that "in a sequence
 
of interrelated tone units, the final position tends to
 
be the major focus of information" (Leech and Short 222­
■ ■ ,125- - ''
 
23), and "in a classically well-behaved sentence, we
 
shall expect the parts of the sentence to be presented
 
in the general order Of increasing semantic weight, in
 
obedience with the principle of climax" (Leech and Short
 
224).
 
Cohesion: The way in which units of language are bound
 
together, relying on cross-reference and linkage.
 
Co-operative principle: H.P. Grice's four maxims: be true,
 
be brief, be relevant be clear, which people assume to
 
be in operation when interpreting discourse.
 
Coordination: "If A is subordinate to B, then A is the
 
circumstantial background against which B is
 
highlighted" (Leech and Short 221).
 
Co-referential forms: Forms which make reference to
 
something else for their interpretation and direct the
 
reader to look elsewhere than their semantic meaning for
 
interpretation.
 
Cross-reference: "The various means which language uses to to
 
indicate 'the same thing' is being referred to or
 
mentioned in different parts of the text" (Leech and
 
Short 244). Cross-reference allows for cohesion
 
(utilizing the principle of reduction) by substituting
 
third-person pronouns for proper nouns.
 
Deictic: Showing or pointing out directly by Using
 
demonstrative pronouns like: this, that, those, here,
 
now.
 
Elegant variation: The use Of a synonymous or almost
 
synonymous expression to avert repetition.
 
Ellipsis: The general term for the figure of omission;
 
omission of clauses, phrases or words that can be
 
recovered from the context or from elsewhere in the
 
discourse.
 
End-focus principle: The syntactic ordering of information
 
in a sentence so that old precedes new.
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Endophoric: A relationship whereby co-referential forms'
 
interpretation lies within the text. There are two
 
kinds: anaphoric and cataphoric.
 
Epistrophe: Repetition of ends.
 
Equivocation: A fallacy that turns on the semantics of
 
words.
 
Ethos. An appeal to the moral sense (Sophist) and the
 
speaker's authority (Aristotelian).
 
Exophoric: A relationship whereby co-referential forms'
 
interpretation lies outside the text.
 
Expressive repetition: Used to emphasize or heighten
 
emotion.
 
Felicity Conditions: Specified circumstances required for
 
the success of performatives.
 
Genetic fallacy: Attacking the cause of someone's belief
 
rather than its justification
 
Hasty generalizations: A conclusion drawn about an entire
 
population based on too small a Scimple.
 
Iconicity: The imitation principle whereby a syntactic
 
relationship exists between words and the objects and
 
events that the words signify.
 
Juxtaposition: A form of cohesive linkage in which units of
 
language are placed side-by-side so that they are
 
presumed interrelated.
 
Linkage: The use of overt connectors such as coordinating
 
conjunctions, subordinating conjunctions and linking
 
adverbials.
 
Logos. Refers to the preferred Aristotelian appeal to reason
 
and logic in dialectal forms of argument.
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Ludic: One of Roland Barthes six principles in rhetoric. A
 
cognate for "play," demonstrated in ironies and/or
 
parpdies; an opposition to work.
 
Pathos: A persuasive appeal to emotion.
 
Performatives: Sentences that express the performance of an
 
act, e.g. I bet you it will rain today.
 
Pragmatics: The study of sign/intent of the speaker
 
Principle of climax: "In a sequence of interrelated tone
 
units, the final position tends to be the major focus of
 
information...[with]parts of the sentence...presented in
 
the general order of increasing semantic weight" (Leech
 
and Short 224).
 
Principle of reduction: Substitution of third-person
 
pronouns for proper nouns.
 
Salience: The promotion of one clause above another in
 
syntactic hierarchy.
 
Segmentation: The use of punctuation and devices such as
 
dashes, italics, breaking up of lines to indicate the
 
rhythm of prose, suggesting emphasis and intonation.
 
Semantics - an analysis of expressions and their meaning; the
 
meaning of words.
 
Semiotics: The general science of signs and languages
 
Sequence: The placement of one clause before or after
 
another.
 
Speech acts: a central sub-domain of pragmatics. A speech
 
act is an utterance defined in terms of intention and/or
 
effect.
 
Straw man: Attacking an opponent's position by attacking a
 
less defensible, similar but different position.
 
Subordination: See Coordination.
 
Syntax: Sentence structure; the study of relations between
 
expressions.
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 APPENDIX;
 
KARL MARX'S C0NFESSI0n24
 
Following is an excerpt from Laura Lafargue's, Marx's
 
daughter. Confessions Book with Marx's version of a Victorian
 
parlor game called Confessions. It was written in English in
 
the mid 1860s.
 
Your favourite virtue
 
Your favourite virtue in a
 
Your favourite virtue in a
 
Your chief characteristic
 
Your idea of happiness
 
Your idea of misery
 
The vice you excuse most
 
The vice you detest most
 
Your aversion
 
Favourite occupation
 
Favourite poet
 
Favourite prose-writer
 
Favourite hero
 
Favourite heroine
 
Favourite flower
 
Favourite colour
 
Favourite name
 
Favourite dish
 
Favourite Maxim
 
Favourite motto
 
Simplicity
 
man Strength
 
woman Weakness
 
Singleness of purpose
 
To fight
 
Submission
 
Gullibility
 
Servility
 
Martin Tupper*
 
Book-worming
 
Shakespeare, Aeschylus,
 
Goethe
 
Diderot
 
Spartacus, Kepler
 
Gretchen
 
Red
 
Laura, Jenny
 
Fish
 
Nihil human! a me
 
alienum puto**
 
De omnibus
 
dubitandum***
 
* Victorian popular writer
 
** "I consider that nothing human is alien to me.
 
*** "You must have doubts about everything."
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 ENDNOTES
 
1 Entitled "Die Judenfrage" and "Die Fahigkeit der
 
heutigen Juden und Christen fret zu werden," respectively,
 
these essays were published in 1843. Marx's review of and
 
response to them, "On the Jewish Question,"was written in
 
1843 but not published until the following year.
 
2 The emphases here and in all Marx's quotations are
 
supplied by Marx.
 
^ Harx derives his definition of species-being from
 
Ludwig Feuerbach who says in The Essence of Christianity (Das
 
Wesen des Christentums) (1841) that man differs in nature
 
from animals by his consciousness of self as an individual
 
and as a member of the human species. A fully realized
 
species-being is one who no longer views himself as an
 
individual but rather as an intrinsic part of the whole
 
community., . .
 
. . ^ Gordon Allport derived this definition from the
 
Thomistic moralists (as discussed by the Rev. John LaFarge,
 
S.J. in The Race Question and the Negro. New York: Longmans,
 
Green, 1945, 174ff)(The Nature of Prejudice 7)
 
5 Allport prefers "ethnicity" to race as this term does
 
not imply biologic unity. Instead, it refers to
 
characteristics of groups that may be, in different
 
proportions, physical, national, cultural linguistic,
 
religious, or ideological in character(Preface, The Nature of
 
Prejudice xii).
 
® Lassalle, as a socialist, first established contact
 
with Marx and Engels during the German revolution 1848-49.
 
He finally met Marx in 1861 and they continued corresponding,
 
though later became estranged due to differences in opinion
 
over the revolutionary versus evolutionary path of Socialism.
 
Lassalle died in a duel in 1864.
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1 Mikhail AleksandroviGh Bakunin was the chief propagator
 
of 19th-century anarchism, a prominent Russian revolutionary
 
agitator, and a prolific political writer. His quarrel with
 
Karl Marx split the European revolutionary movement for many
 
years.
 
® The First International, formally international Working
 
Men's Association, was founded in London on September 28,
 
1864. It was a federation 6i workers' groups that had a
 
considerable influence as a unifying force for labor in
 
Europe during the latter part of the 19th certtury. Karl Marx,
 
though he had ho part in organizing the meeting, was elected
 
one of the 32 members of the provisional General Council and
 
assumed its leadership. The First International split at its
 
Hague Congress in 1872 over the clash between Marx's
 
centralized socialism and Bakunin's anarchism. In order to
 
prevent the Bakunists from gaining control of the
 
association, the General Council, prompted by Marx, moved its
 
headquarters to New York City, where it lingered until it was
 
formally disbanded at the Philadelphia Conference in July
 
1876.
 
9 Roland Barthes definition of rhetoric was that of a
 
metalanguage—a discourse on discourse-—that involved the
 
following: 1) technique; 2) teaching; 3) science; 4) ethic;
 
5) social practice; and 6) ludic. For a full treatment see
 
Roland Barthes, "The Old Rhetoric: an aide-memoire," The
 
Semiotic Challenge. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Hill
 
and Wang, 1988, 13-14.
 
In addition, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was a man
 
for whom writing was action. He is known as a proponent of
 
popular existentialism, a playwright, novelist, critic and
 
biographer. His political activism centered around a renewal
 
of Marxism, incorporating a flexibility to allow it to adapt
 
to particular situations and where the individual freedom of
 
man was respected.
 
Feuerbach's inversion of Hegel's philosophy that "man
 
is spirit (or God) in the process of self-alienation and
 
self-realization...yields the theme that religion is a
 
phenomenon of human self-estrangement" (Tucker xxii-xxiii).
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12 Though Fish's dialectic is highly specialized and
 
relies in large measure upon the classical definition, his
 
descriptions of its use hold in this instance for Marx.
 
13 The Marx^Eriaels Reader 2nd ed. 1978. According to
 
editor Robert Tucker, Marx uses quotation marks
 
indiscriminately, sdmetimes setting off paraphrases with
 
quotation marks.
 
14 Marx uses his own italics when citing another's
 
material, which may or may not signify the author's original
 
emphases.
 
13 Quoted from Bauer's "The Jewish Question."
 
13 The monad, usually referred to as a circumscribed
 
monad, is degenerate and has a special connotation for Marx,
 
antithetical to his concept of the species beings who is one
 
who cooperates with his fellow man, and who "has recognized
 
and organized his own powers {forces propres) as social
 
powers so that he no longer separates this social power from
 
himself as political power" (Marx, "Question" 46). The
 
monad is an egoist who sets himself apart by being the owner
 
of the means of production and who retains the surplus value
 
provided by those who labor. This concept and the idea that
 
the only things that exist are relations, "all being is
 
contingent," the only being is the relation of one thing to
 
another thing, are elaborated upon in the "Economic and
 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844" and "The German Ideology"
 
(1845-46).
 
1^ These are the same rhetorical devices found in most
 
fanatical tracts. Mein Kampf contains the same stratagem and
 
one sees it in the speeches of Louis Farrakhan.
 
18 Marx became a member in the same year the Doktor Klub
 
was founded, 1837. The Club was made up of representatives
 
of the radical wing of the Hegelian school in Berlin. Bruno
 
Bauer, a lecturer in theology at the Berlin University, was
 
also an active member.
 
Written in 1844-45 in collaboration with Engels.
 
20 Preface to the French Constitution
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21 The Cooperative Principle states: Make your
 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage
 
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of
 
the talk exchange in which you are engaged. It's maxims are:
 
Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is
 
required (for the current purposes of the exchange). Do not
 
make your contribution more informative than is required.
 
Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not
 
say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Relation: Be
 
relevant. Manner: Be perspicuous^ avoid obscurity of
 
expression, avoid ambiguity> be brief, be orderly.(qtd. in
 
Brown & Yule 31-32).
 
22 jn order for hearers to ascertain whether
 
conversational implicature is present, they rely on the
 
following data:
 
1. the conventional meaning of the words used, together with
 
the identity of any references that may be involved;
 
2. the Cooperative Principle and its maxims;
 
3. the context, linguistic or otherwise;
 
4. other items of background knowledge; and
 
5. the fact(or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling
 
under the previous headings are available to both
 
participants and both participants know or assume this to
 
be the case.(Grice 154-55)
 
23 Ann Weiser explains the phrase "carry forward" by
 
saying, "Often conversational participants have purposes that
 
can be accomplished indirectly, in conversations that are
 
'about' something else. But sometimes one of the purposes
 
may be to have the conversation be about a particular topic,
 
perhaps only if that topic is 'safe,' or if some other
 
precondition is met" (727).
 
24 Excerpted from David McLellan's Karl Marx: Interviews
 
and Recollections, p. 167 (whose source was the Moscow
 
Reminiscences of Marx and Engels p.266).
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